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“Intelligence” Searches and 
Purpose: A Significant Mismatch 
Between Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure and the Law of 
Intelligence-Gathering 
 
Robert C. Power  
 
Hassan Abu-Jihaad, a United States citizen who served in 
the U.S. Navy for about four years, was indicted in 2007 for 
providing information to a terrorist group via email and the 
internet.1  In particular, Abu-Jihaad was charged with sending 
classified information about a U.S. Navy Battle Group 
scheduled for deployment in the Persian Gulf region in 2001.2  
Separate counts charged providing material support to a 
conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals and communicating national 
defense information to persons not entitled to receive it.3 
While the charges were pending, the government filed 
notice of its intention to use evidence derived from national 
security electronic surveillance.4  Abu-Jihaad‘s counsel moved 
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1. Indictment, United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 2007 WL 4961131, at ¶¶ 1, 
12-27 (D. Conn. Mar. 5, 2008) (No. 07CR57), 2007 WL 4961131. 
2. Id. ¶¶ 21, 25, 31. 
3. Id. ¶¶ 28-31.  The providing material support count was charged 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006), id. ¶ 29, and the communicating national 
defense information count was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (2006), id. ¶ 
31. 
4. Amended Notice of Intention to Use Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act Information Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1825(d), United States v. 
Abu-Jihaad, 2008 WL 676037 (D. Conn. Mar. 5, 2008) (No.07CR57).  See 
Motion to Suppress FISA Derived Evidence, United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 
2008 WL 676037 (D. Conn. Mar. 5, 2008) (No. 07CR57), 2007 WL 4961126, at 
¶ 2 (discussing the Government‘s Motion). 
1
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to suppress that evidence but found his hands tied because he 
was not permitted to view either the legal documents in 
support of the government‘s electronic surveillance application 
or the orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(―FISC‖) issued in reliance on those documents.5  The defense 
motion was in some respects similar to shadowboxing, as 
arguments were necessarily presented on the basis of 
assumptions and guesses about the nature of the government‘s 
investigation and the strength of its case against Abu-Jihaad 
and his unindicted co-conspirators.6  The trial judge denied 
Abu-Jihaad‘s request for information about the surveillance, 
examined the documents in camera, and upheld the use of the 
evidence in the criminal trial.7  Abu-Jihaad was convicted of 
both charges in 2008.8  In 2009, the judge upheld the conviction 
for providing classified information and granted a judgment of 
acquittal on the material support charge.9 
Several years before Abu-Jihaad‘s conviction, FBI agents 
assisting Spanish authorities who were themselves 
investigating the March 2004 Madrid train-bombing, focused 
attention on an Oregon attorney, Brandon Mayfield.10  A 
fingerprint was recovered on items used in the bombing, and 
FBI analysis determined it to be similar to 20 fingerprints 
which the FBI had on file in its Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (―AFIS‖).11  Mayfield‘s ―adherence to the 
 
5. Motion to Suppress FISA Derived Evidence, supra note 4, at ¶ 3.  See 
also infra note 80 (discussing the FISC). 
6. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress FISA Derived 
Evidence, United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 2008 WL 676037 (D. Conn. Mar. 5, 
2008) (No 07CR57), 2007 WL 4961127.  For example, counsel tried to make 
an argument under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), that the 
government‘s applications contained false information about the classified 
nature of some of the information in question, but was unable to point to 
specific assertions in the applications and argue that they were recklessly 
false.  Id. 
7. United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301 (D. Conn. 
2008). 
8. Jury Verdict, United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 2008 WL 676037 (D. Conn. 
Mar. 5, 2008). 
9. United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 600 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365 (D. Conn. 
2009). 
10. See Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1027 (D. Or. 
2007), vacated, 588 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2009). 
11. Id. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
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Muslim faith,‖12 led the FBI to conduct electronic surveillance 
at Mayfield‘s home and law office, and to execute surreptitious 
searches of both locations.13  Mayfield was later subjected to 
material witness proceedings, arrest, incommunicado custody, 
and pressure to confess.14  The fingerprint was later matched to 
an Algerian man who was apparently involved in the terrorist 
bombings, and Mayfield was exonerated.15 
Mayfield was far more fortunate than Abu-Jihaad.  His 
custody was short, and he received a substantial settlement for 
most of his claims against the government.16  Still, United 
States citizens suspected of terrorist activities, or even 
involvement with foreign organizations, can take little comfort 
from this story.17  The settlement did not resolve Mayfield‘s 
 
12. Id. at 1027. 
13. Id. at 1029. 
14. See id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 1026.  See, e.g., Ryan Geddes, Mayfield Settles Case Against 
Feds for $2 Million, BEAVERTON VALLEY TIMES, Nov. 29, 2006, available at 
http://www.beavertonvalleytimes.com/news/story.php?story_id=11648268729
1016800; Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Will Pay $2 Million to Lawyer Wrongly Jailed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at A18; Henry Schuster & Terry Frieden, Lawyer 
Wrongly Arrested in Bombings: 'We lived in 1984', CNN.COM, Nov. 30, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/11/29/mayfield.suit/index.html. 
17. There are obviously many other intriguing stories about the 
treatment of U.S. citizens and others in the United States and elsewhere 
during the war on terrorism.  One intriguing story involved Cyrus Kar, who 
was taken into custody by the United States military in Iraq in 2005.  See 
Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2008).  An American 
citizen working on a documentary film, Kar and his Iraqi cameraman were 
traveling in a Baghdad taxi when they were stopped by Iraqi police.  Id. at 
81.  Kar was promptly transferred to U.S. military custody, where he was 
held for over seven weeks, most of that time in solitary confinement, in harsh 
conditions, at a military detention center.  Id. at 82.  At one point Kar was 
interrogated by an FBI agent.  Id.  According to the district court‘s written 
opinion in Kar‘s civil case against the government, ―[w]hen he asked the 
agent if he could speak with an attorney, the agent laughed and replied that 
none were available.  The agent added that Kar had the right to remain 
silent, but he said that the last person to exercise that right was still being 
detained in Afghanistan two years later.‖  Id.  Kar agreed to talk, submitted 
to a polygraph examination, and consented to a search of his home in 
California.  Id.  A status hearing pursuant to the Geneva Conventions was 
held on short notice.  Id.  The hearing officers concluded that Kar was 
innocent, and he was released six days later.  Id. at 82-83.  A federal district 
court later dismissed a damages action that Kar brought against the 
government, largely on the basis of qualified immunity.  Id. at 86.  While the 
court concluded that, as a United States citizen, Kar was protected by the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments—even while abroad in a war zone—and that 
3
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claim that an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (―FISA‖)18 violated the Fourth Amendment.19  
Related arguments claimed that covert physical searches 
authorized by amendments to FISA similarly violated the 
Fourth Amendment.20  Mayfield prevailed in the district 
court,21 but most other challengers to those provisions have 
failed, including Abu-Jihaad.22  As a result, even American 
citizens in the United States are likely to remain subject to 
tactics more conducive to war than to criminal investigation.  
This is true, even though, as in Mayfield and possibly in Abu-
Jihaad, the government is investigating a past criminal act.  
Moreover, even if the courts reverse direction and follow the 
Mayfield court‘s approach, victims will not be remedied until 
their rights are clearly established,23 something that is not 
 
he had been denied some of those rights by this treatment, those rights were 
not clearly established in law, and therefore, the court could not support an 
award of damages.  Id. at 84-86.  The court‘s ruling illustrates some of the 
difficulties of enforcing constitutional rights abroad and during wartime.  
While the court in Kar concluded that the initial arrest and detention were 
lawful under war conditions, but that the delay of forty-eight days from Kar‘s 
arrest to his probable cause hearing exceeded constitutional limits, the court 
was unable to conclude that there had been a violation of a clearly 
established right to a prompt probable cause hearing under combat 
conditions.  Id. at 84-85.  The result of the case was judicial recognition that, 
even for a United States citizen arrested several years into the occupation of 
Iraq, nothing resembling the rights recognized in the criminal justice system 
could legitimately be imposed on the military‘s efforts to conduct the war on 
terror within a war zone. 
18. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
19. See Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1030. 
20. Id. at 1030-33 (discussing the United and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 
291 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823).  Mayfield argued that 
the USA-PATRIOT Act‘s FISA amendments allow the government to ―avoid 
the Fourth Amendment‘s probable cause requirement when conducting 
surveillance or searches of a criminal suspect‘s home or office merely by 
asserting a desire to also gather foreign intelligence information from the 
person whom the government intends to criminally prosecute.‖  Id. at 1032. 
21. Id. at 1042-43.  The decision, however, was vacated and remanded by 
the Ninth Circuit due to Mayfield‘s lack of standing.  Mayfield v. United 
States, 588 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2009). 
22. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299, 304 (D. Conn. 
2008) (expressly rejecting the holding in Mayfield). 
23. A major obstacle to civil relief for claims of Fourth Amendment 
violations in this arena is the fact that qualified immunity will prevent 
recovery unless the right is clearly established at the time the alleged 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
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even on the horizon nearly a decade after the beginning of the 
War on Terror. 
The last twenty years have seen a dramatic expansion of 
military and civilian efforts against international terrorism.  
Every few years, legislation has tweaked the federal criminal 
code or intelligence laws to make it easier to identify and 
incarcerate terrorists.  Much of this legislation has been 
appropriate, especially in light of new technology that has 
made it more difficult to collect intelligence and evidence 
against foreign agents.  Other legislative acts, however, have 
created more problems than they seem to have solved. 
President George W. Bush‘s first Attorney General, John 
Ashcroft, announced the ―New Paradigm‖ soon after September 
11, 2001.24  This was a change in the Department of Justice‘s 
(―DOJ‖) mission from prosecution of criminals to prevention of 
terrorism.25  In the name of anti-terrorism, many of the Bush 
administration‘s efforts expanded law enforcement‘s powers to 
act. 
The constitutional doctrine that existed prior to this shift 
in emphasis may not be enough to protect the public as the 
founders had intended.  While some judicial decisions and legal 
trends are responsive to expanded government powers, such as 
the extraterritorial application of Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights, others are less so.  This would include the apparent 
 
violation occurred.  See Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 83-84 (D.D.C. 
2008) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 583 U.S. 174, 201 (2001)). 
24. See JOHN ASHCROFT, NEVER AGAIN: SERVING AMERICA AND RESTORING 
JUSTICE 124-26, 133 (2006) (describing a need for new infrastructure and a 
culture of preventing terrorism rather than prosecuting terrorist crimes).  See 
also infra note 25. 
25. John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, Speech before 
Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 10, 2003), http://usinfo.org/wf-
archive/2003/030210/epf116.htm (―In order to fight and to defeat terrorism, 
the Department of Justice has added a new paradigm to that of prosecution—
a paradigm of prevention.‖).  See also JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 33 (2008); 
David Cole, Are We Safer?, 53 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 4 (2006), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18752 (reviewing DANIEL BENJAMIN & 
STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE OF THE WAR ON TERROR AND A 
STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT (2006)) (―Within the US, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft repeatedly promoted what he labeled a new ‗paradigm of 
prevention‘ in law enforcement.‖); Tillie Fong, Ashcroft Defends the Patriot 
Act, ROCKYMOUNTAINNEWS.COM, Nov. 28, 2007, 
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2007/nov/28/ashcroft-defends-the-
patriot-act/. 
5
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green light that Congress has given the government to use 
intelligence tools to investigate criminal activity, as identified 
in Mayfield.26 
This Article addresses the role of constitutional criminal 
procedure in national security investigations, focusing on the 
role of government‘s purpose in taking action.  This is the key 
question, given Ashcroft‘s redirection of the Department of 
Justice.  The same tools are used in both criminal and 
intelligence investigations.  If the government searches a home 
or conducts electronic surveillance, it intrudes on the same 
privacy interests and learns the same type of data—physical 
evidence that is located in the home or words that are spoken 
in the vicinity of a microphone.  What differs is the 
government‘s purpose—the reason for taking the action.  
Purpose inquiries are critical to this issue because it is the 
purpose of the investigation that determines the applicable 
law.  Here, a subtle part of the USA-PATRIOT Act and its 
amendments to FISA have had a major impact, as considered 
by the courts in Abu-Jihaad and Mayfield.  This Article 
therefore examines FISA, with particular attention to the 2001 
amendments, to determine if the distinction between a criminal 
investigatory purpose and a foreign intelligence purpose can 
and should be dispositive of Fourth Amendment issues.  Most 
courts have concluded that the change was appropriate, but 
this Article argues that, under a totality of the circumstances 
approach consistent with Fourth Amendment analysis 
generally, the courts have overlooked both the significance of 
the change and the fact that it has created an easy road to 
conduct extraordinarily intrusive warrantless searches without 
probable cause.  It would be too strong to say that the 2001 
amendments were a paving stone on the road to the hell of a 
police state—but it would not be too much to say that they 
permit the government to play bait-and-switch with the courts 
in a fashion that denigrates constitutional rights without any 
apparent gain in serving national security. 
 
 
26. See 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1027. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
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I.  FISA and the Expansion of National Security Surveillance 
 
A. The Landscape in 1978 
 
The central legal authority concerning intelligence 
collection is FISA, which was enacted in 1978.27  FISA was 
passed following Senate hearings on abusive practices in the 
United States and abroad by the CIA.28  The hearings fed a 
national belief that executive discretion in the field of 
intelligence required greater oversight.  FISA was also, in large 
part, a response to the Supreme Court‘s decision in United 
States v. United States District Court (Keith).29  Keith 
presented the executive branch with a mandate to conform its 
domestic actions to the Fourth Amendment.30 
 
1.  Keith 
 
The Keith decision involved the warrantless electronic 
surveillance of Robert Plamondon, a defendant in a federal 
prosecution of radicals for destruction of government 
property.31  The government acknowledged that Plamondon 
 
27. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
28. The Senate Report to FISA referred at length to the abuses 
uncovered in Senate hearings chaired by Frank Church of Idaho and to the 
case law of the time, including Keith.  S. REP. NO. 95-604 (pt. I), at 7-15 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908-16.  For a good history of 
intelligence actions by United States agencies, including the CIA leading up 
to the Church Committee hearings, see Seth Kreimer, Watching the 
Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and Political Freedom in the War on 
Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133 (2004).  See also generally Richard Henry 
Seamon, Domestic Surveillance For International Terrorists: Presidential 
Power and Fourth Amendment Limits, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449 (2008) 
(placing unilateral executive actions in historical and constitutional 
perspective); James G. McAdams III, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA): An Overview, U.S. DEP‘T OF HOMELAND SEC., March 2007, 
http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-
faqs/articles/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act.html/. 
29. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 
(1972).  All justices participating in the decision agreed with the outcome.  
Justice Rehnquist, who had recently served in the Department of Justice, 
recused himself. 
30. See id. 
31. Id. at 299.  Keith is addressed in several recent articles on FISA and 
related issues.  See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, International Crime and Terrorism: 
7
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had been subject to warrantless electronic surveillance, but 
argued that it was authorized by Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control Act (―Title III‖),32 which regulated federal and 
state use of electronic surveillance.33  The technical issue was 
whether language in Title III that indicated that the statute 
did not limit any presidential power to protect national security 
had the effect of giving the President the power to conduct 
electronic surveillance directed against domestic groups that 
advocated violence against the government.34  The Court 
concluded that ―Congress simply left presidential powers where 
it found them,‖35 neither adding to them, as argued by the 
government, nor taking away from them.36  This was, in 
essence, a decision based on plain-meaning statutory 
interpretation.  The Court stressed the limits of its analysis, 
 
The Bush Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Fourth 
Amendment’s Warrant Requirement: Lessons From Justice Powell and the 
Keith Case, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1259, 1279-92 (2008); Dan Fenske, 
Comment, All Enemies, Foreign and Domestic: Erasing the Distinction 
Between Foreign and Domestic Intelligence Gathering Under the Fourth 
Amendment, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 353-55 (2008).  For contemporary 
readings of Keith, see United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 601-02 (3d Cir. 
1973); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1973). 
32. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 
No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)). 
33. Keith, 407 U.S. at 300. 
34. The language in question stated: 
 
Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the 
constitutional power of the President to take such measures 
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual 
or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, 
to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential 
to the security of the United States, or to protect national 
security information against foreign intelligence activities.  
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to 
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such 
measures as he deems necessary to protect the United 
States against the overthrow of the Government by force or 
other unlawful means, or against any other clear and 
present danger to the structure or existence of the 
Government. 
 
82 Stat. at 214, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970), repealed by Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1783, 1797. 
35. Keith, 407 U.S. at 303. 
36. Id. at 302-08. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
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noting that the case did not concern the President‘s powers 
concerning foreign actions occurring ―within or without this 
country.‖37 
The opinion was classic ―Justice Powell‖:38 it was cautious, 
it tried to follow a middle course, and it purported to be fact-
bound even as it discussed side or unnecessary issues.  The 
discussion of presidential power led to a discussion of 
legitimate concerns about electronic surveillance and the 
important role that the Fourth Amendment plays due to the 
substantial impact that electronic surveillance has on 
privacy.39  This typical judicial balancing of legitimate public 
values against the impact on civil liberties then led to the 
Court‘s explanation of why a warrant requirement is 
constitutionally required: ―These fourth amendment freedoms 
cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security 
surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of 
the Executive Branch.‖40 
The Court addressed the question of the purpose of a 
government search for intelligence information in an 
unremarkable discussion of arguably applicable Fourth 
Amendment exceptions.  The Court described the purpose of 
the electronic surveillance directed at Plamondon as ―the 
 
37. Id. at 308.  The Court both confronted the fact that all post-World 
War II presidents had asserted the power to use electronic surveillance 
against domestic subversives, and it recognized the value of electronic 
surveillance to legitimate government investigations.  Id. at 310-11 & n.10. 
38. Justice Powell‘s attempt to forge a path between constitutional 
absolutes is acknowledged in numerous commentaries.  See, e.g., Paul R. 
Baier, Of Bakke’s Balance, Gratz and Grutter: The Voice of Justice Powell, 78 
TUL. L. REV. 1955 (2004); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the 
Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987); 
Craig Evan Klafter, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: A Pragmatic Relativist, 8 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (1998); Sandra Day O‘Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis 
F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 395 (1987); Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. 
Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1854 (1995). 
39. Keith, 407 U.S. at 312-13.  The opinion also notes the fact that 
national security cases tend to challenge First Amendment values, as the line 
between legitimate political dissent and illegitimate political subversion is 
vague.  Id. at 313.  This concern became codified in FISA.  See infra note 85. 
40. Id. at 316-17.  As in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), 
which was then and is still today, the central decision on the meaning of 
―search‖ under the Fourth Amendment, the Court noted that the electronic 
surveillance conducted against Plamondon might have been reasonable under 
the facts, but that this was not sufficient—prior judicial authorization was 
required under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 317-18. 
9
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collecting and maintaining of intelligence with respect to 
subversive forces, and . . . not an attempt to gather evidence for 
specific criminal prosecutions.‖41  The Court rejected the 
government‘s argument that this motivation either rendered 
the Fourth Amendment inapplicable or permitted unilateral 
executive branch action.42  The Court‘s reasoning provided 
some direction for resolving present-day problems.  ―Official 
surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or 
ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of 
constitutionally protected privacy of speech.‖43  Thus, an 
intelligence, rather than a law enforcement purpose, did not 
convince eight justices in 1972 that a non-law enforcement 
purpose—even such a compelling one as preventing violence by 
subversive groups—was sufficient to justify doing away with 
traditional Fourth Amendment protections. 
Keith necessarily left gaps in the constitutional law of 
intelligence-gathering.  First, and most obviously, the warrant 
requirement it imposed did not extend, at least on its own 
terms, to cases involving foreign intelligence.  The opinion 
ended by reiterating that the warrant requirement applied only 
to ―domestic aspects of national security,‖ without fully 
defining the category, other than to state that the ruling did 
not apply to ―foreign powers or their agents.‖44  Second, the 
opinion emphasized that electronic surveillance for domestic 
intelligence might be appropriate under different standards 
than those that apply to criminal law enforcement, noting both 
its own use of constitutional interest balancing for non-law 
enforcement searches, as well as the propriety of congressional 
action to establish reasonable standards.45  Thus, Keith seemed 
 
41. Id. at 318-19. 
42. Id. at 319-20. 
43. Id. at 320.  The Court concluded that courts are sufficiently 
knowledgeable about national security and are not too insecure to handle 
such important matters.  Id.  It characterized the adverse impact on the 
executive branch of a warrant requirement as simply a minor added 
―inconvenience.‖  Id. at 321. 
44. Id. at 321-22 & n.20. 
45. Id. at 322-23.  The Court specifically quoted Camara v. Municipal 
Court, which had applied the Fourth Amendment‘s warrant clause to 
administrative inspections, and which had utilized justifications that were 
different in kind and degree from probable cause.  Id. at 323 (quoting Camara 
v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)).  This can be seen as an early 
reference to the category that later became known as ―special needs‖ 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
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to acknowledge the existence of three categories of searches: 
criminal law enforcement searches, including electronic 
surveillance as authorized by Title III;46 foreign intelligence 
searches, which might be immune from the warrant 
requirement and which were (then) ungoverned by federal 
statutory law;47 and domestic intelligence searches, such as 
that which was directed at Plamondon, and which were fully 
subject to the Fourth Amendment.48  At least in the absence of 
statutory provisions authorizing domestic security searches 
and electronic surveillance, presumably the traditional Fourth 
Amendment requirements applied to such searches. 
Several lower courts decided in the 1970s to accept the 
Keith Court‘s invitation to recognize a presidential power to 
conduct searches against ―foreign powers.‖49  Although the 
Supreme Court never accepted any of these decisions for 
review, it is fair to conclude that the general approval of this 
theory represented a consensus that ―foreign intelligence‖ cases 
were different, although there was no uniform understanding 
of all of the defining factors differentiating domestic from 
foreign cases.  This became relatively unimportant because 
FISA was enacted in 1978, and it became the primary 
authority, rather than the negative-pregnant implications of 
the Keith decision.  Still, one case involving pre-FISA electronic 
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes is worth 
discussing, both because it has received substantial attention 
over the years and because it seems to be the origin of the key 
factor in differentiating foreign intelligence searches from other 
searches—the primary purpose test. 
United States v. Truong, decided in 1980, after FISA had 
been enacted, concerned electronic surveillance and physical 
 
searches.  See infra Part II(A). 
46. 407 U.S. at 306. 
47. See id. at 308-09. 
48. See id. at 321-22. 
49. See, e.g., Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 575-77 (E.D. Mich. 
1979), vacated, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); 
United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 890 (1977); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 
602-06 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).  But cf. Chagnon v. 
Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1259 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 911 
(1981) (noting that prior decisions invalidating domestic intelligence 
operations did not invalidate foreign intelligence operations). 
11
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searches that had been conducted in 1977 and 1978, prior to 
the final congressional action on FISA.50  The case addressed 
several months of electronic surveillance of Truong‘s telephone 
and his apartment, all conducted without court authorization.51  
The Fourth Circuit upheld the lower court‘s decision to admit 
evidence from the first several weeks of the electronic 
surveillance, but it suppressed the rest.52  Warrantless 
electronic surveillance during the first time period was 
permissible because the court agreed that there was inherent 
executive power to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance.53  
At least two limitations served to prevent executive abuse of its 
powers in this area.  First, the court limited the power to 
conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to situations where 
―the object of the search or the surveillance is a foreign power, 
its agent or collaborators.‖54  Second, the court affirmed the 
district court‘s conclusion that the executive power extends 
only so long as ―the surveillance is conducted ‗primarily‘ for 
foreign intelligence reasons.‖55  This distinction was rooted in 
both competency and theoretical reasons: courts, rather than 
administrative officials, are the experts and appropriate bodies 
to evaluate the justification for criminal investigative 
techniques.56  At the same time, privacy concerns typical of 
Fourth Amendment analysis eclipse international policy 
concerns once the government is working toward a criminal 
prosecution.57  The court did not try to split the hairs any more 
finely—a search was either primarily intelligence or primarily 
criminal, and this categorization would determine the 
appropriate standards for authorization.  In a brief concluding 
 
50. United States v. Dinh Hung (Truong), 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). 
51. Id. at 912. 
52. Id. at 913, 931. 
53. The court interpreted Keith as acknowledging executive power in 
this realm, finding that the policies the Supreme Court held not to be 
prevailing in the arena of domestic intelligence were sufficiently convincing 
in the area of foreign intelligence.  Id. at 913-15.  These policies include 
executive expertise in international relations and the relative lack of 
knowledge by judges.  Id. at 913-14. 
54. Id. at 915. 
55. Id. 
56. Here the court, to some extent, jumps to the conclusion that probable 
cause is the key factor once a search occurs in a criminal investigation.  See 
id. 
57. Id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
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section that provided guidance for later developments, the 
court addressed the facts indicating the shift in the Truong 
investigation.  Prior to July 20, 1977, the matter had been an 
intelligence investigation.58  At that time, however, the 
Criminal Division of the Justice Department clearly took 
charge of the investigation as it began to structure a criminal 
prosecution.59  Thus, in the case that most fully considered the 
scope of governmental powers concerning foreign intelligence 
prior to FISA, the purpose of the search or surveillance was the 
critical factor in determining the applicable law. 
 
2.  FISA 
 
FISA largely tracked the Keith and Truong analysis by 
providing a legal structure for several different varieties of 
electronic surveillance.60  Some forms of electronic surveillance 
were to remain exempt from judicial oversight.  Thus, Section 
102 of the FISA statute provided generally that the President 
could authorize electronic surveillance without a court order 
when the surveillance is directed at communications of foreign 
powers and ―there is no substantial likelihood‖ of intercepting 
the communications of any United States citizen or permanent 
resident.61  The several definitions of ―electronic surveillance‖ 
 
58. See id. at 915. 
59. Id. at 916. 
60. Numerous articles detail FISA and its history.  See, e.g., Adam 
Burton, Fixing FISA For Long War: Regulating Warrantless Surveillance in 
the Age of Terrorism, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 381, 386-89 (2006); Beryl A. Howell & 
Dana J. Lesemann, FISA’s Fruits in Criminal Cases: An Opportunity For 
Improved Accountability, 12 UCLA J. INT‘L L. & FOREIGN AFF., 145, 147-51 
(2007); Richard Henry Seamon, Domestic Surveillance For International 
Terrorists: Presidential Power and Fourth Amendment Limits, 35 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 449 (2008); William Pollack, Note, Shu’ubiyya or Security?  
Preserving Civil Liberties by Limiting FISA Evidence to National Security 
Prosecutions, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 221, 224-31 (2008).  See also supra 
note 28. 
61. The statute provides in pertinent part: 
 
Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through 
the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance 
without a court order . . . to acquire foreign intelligence 
information for periods of up to one year if the Attorney 
General certifies in writing under oath that . . . 
(A) the electronic surveillance is solely directed at . . . (i) 
13
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also limited the application of the judicial authorization 
provisions of the statute.62  Consistent with the technology of 
the period and the model provided by Title III, the law 
generally covered the acquisition of the contents of 
conversations when they involved United States persons, 
international communications with one end in the United 
States, or where the act of acquisition took place in the United 
States.63  This made the law partially extra-territorial in effect, 
 
the acquisition of the contents of communications 
transmitted by means of communications used exclusively 
between or among foreign powers, . . .or (ii) the acquisition 
of technical intelligence, other than the spoken 
communications of individuals, from property or premises 
under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power . . . 
(B) there is no substantial likelihood that the 
surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication 
to which a United States person is a party; and 
(C) [adequate minimization procedures are followed]. 
 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 
102(a)(1)(A)-(C), 92 Stat. 1783, 1786-87 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A)-
(C) (2006)).  The section also includes requirements that the Justice 
Department report to the Chief Justice and pertinent House and Senate 
committees.  See id. § 102(a)(1)-(3), 92 Stat. at 1786-87. 
62. Id. § 101(f)(1)-(3), 92 Stat. at 1785 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1)-
(3) (2006)). 
63. The statute defines the term ―electronic surveillance‖ as: 
 
(1) the acquisition by an electronic . . . device of the 
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or 
intended to be received by a particular, known United 
States person who is in the United States, if the contents 
are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States 
person, under circumstances in which a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be 
required for law enforcement purposes; 
(2) the acquisition by an electronic . . . device of the 
contents of any wire communication to or from a person in 
the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, 
if such acquisition occurs in the United States . . . 
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic . . . device 
of the contents of any radio communication, under 
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for 
law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all 
intended recipients are located within the United States . . . 
. 
 
Id. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
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a fact noted in the Senate Report.64  The definition of ―foreign 
power‖ begins by tracking conventional usage to include foreign 
governments, factions, or foreign-based political organizations, 
but also includes international terrorism, defined as violent or 
otherwise dangerous actions that are both violations of 
criminal law and intended to intimidate governments or 
civilians.65  Another central definition concerns ―foreign 
intelligence information,‖ which is defined in two respects.  The 
information must relate to the nation‘s ability to protect itself 
from attack, sabotage, international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence by foreign entities.66  Alternatively, and far more 
generally, if a foreign power is involved, the information must 
relate to national defense or security or the conduct of foreign 
 
64. See S. REP. NO. 95-604 (pt. I) at 40 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3942. 
65. The statute includes as a definition of ―foreign power,‖ ―a group 
engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.‖  
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101(a)(4), 
92 Stat. 1783, 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2006)).  The statute 
also defines ―international terrorism‖ as activities that: 
 
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life 
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States 
or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if 
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or 
any State; 
(2) appear to be intended . . . (A) to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population; (B) to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or (C) to affect the 
conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; 
and 
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend 
national boundaries . . . . 
 
Id. § 101(c)(1)-(3), 92 Stat. at 1784 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(1)-(3) 
(2006)). 
66. Id. § 101(e)(1), 92 Stat. at 1784 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1) 
(2006)).  The statute states that ―foreign intelligence information‖ includes: 
 
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United 
States person is necessary to protect against . . . (A) actual 
or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign 
power; (B) sabotage [or] international terrorism . . . by a 
foreign power . . . ; or (C) clandestine intelligence activities 
by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power . . . 
 
Id. 
15
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affairs.67  In both aspects, if the information concerns a United 
States person, then the information must be ―necessary‖ to the 
ability to protect national defense, security, or foreign affairs.68  
The emphasis on protection for U.S. citizens and resident 
aliens from unjustified intrusion is a recurring theme in the 
statute and its legislative history.69 
With respect to electronic surveillance of covered 
individuals for intelligence purposes, the law requires judicial 
permission somewhat analogous to the electronic surveillance 
warrants governed by Title III for traditional criminal activity. 
The first of two key provisions regulating use of electronic 
surveillance with court involvement was included in Section 
104 of FISA.70  This provision includes numerous requirements 
for applications for court orders approving electronic 
surveillance.  The central requirements are that the 
application include the facts supporting the conclusion that the 
target of the electronic surveillance is ―a foreign agent or an 
agent of a foreign power‖ and that the facilities subject to the 
surveillance are used by a foreign power,71 as well as ―a 
detailed description of the nature of the information sought‖72 
and a series of certifications by senior executive officials.73  
These certifications relate to the conclusion that the 
 
67. Id. § 101(e)(2), 92 Stat. at 1785 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2) 
(2006)) (stating that foreign intelligence information also includes: 
―information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates 
to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to . . . (A) the 
national defense or security of the United States; or (B) the conduct of the 
foreign affairs of the United States‖). 
68. See id. § 101(e)(1)-(2), 92 Stat. at 1784-85 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 
1801(e)(1)-(2) (2006)) (each using the word ―necessary‖). 
69. See, e.g., id. § 101(b), (e), (f), (h), 92 Stat. at 1783-86 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. § 1801(b), (e), (f), (n) (2006)) (definitions dependent on whether person 
in question is a U.S. person).  See also S. REP. NO. 95-604 (pt. I) at 40 
(discussing the definition of ―United States person‖ and noting controversies 
about the limited protections accorded to other persons). 
70. See id. § 104, 92 Stat. at 1788-90 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 
1804 (2006)). 
71. Id. § 104(a)(4), 92 Stat. at 1788-89 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 
1804(a)(3) (2006)). 
72. Id. § 104(a)(6), 92 Stat. at 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 
1804(a)(5) (2006)).  The current version of the statute no longer requires that 
the description be ―detailed.‖ 
73. Id. § 104(a)(7), 92 Stat. at 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 
1804(a)(6) (2006)).  Again, the ―foreign power‖ category now includes 
participants in international terrorism. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
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information is ―foreign intelligence information,‖74 describing 
the appropriate statutory category,75 and the basis for the 
certifications.76  In the initial version of FISA, a required 
certification was that ―the purpose of the surveillance‖ was to 
obtain foreign intelligence information.77  In the USA-
PATRIOT Act, Congress amended this required certification to 
require that ―a significant purpose of the surveillance‖ be to 
obtain foreign intelligence information.78  This subtle language 
distinction belies the substantial political and legal controversy 
concerning the purpose distinction between criminal 
investigation and foreign intelligence. 
The second key provision regulating use of electronic 
surveillance with court involvement was Section 105 of FISA, 
or the ―Issuance of order‖ provision.79  This provision requires 
that the judge80 make a series of findings concerning: proper 
authorization of the application within the Department of 
Justice,81 probable cause,82 minimization,83 and compliance 
with all certification requirements.84  The probable cause 
 
74. Id. § 104(a)(7)(A), 92 Stat. 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 
1804(a)(6)(A) (2006)). 
75. Id. § 104(a)(7)(D), 92 Stat. 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 
1804(a)(6)(D) (2006)). 
76. Id. § 104(a)(7)(E), 92 Stat. at 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 
1804(a)(6)(E) (2006)). 
77. Id. § 104(a)(7)(B), 92 Stat. at 1789 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 
1804(a)(6)(B) (2006)). 
78. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291, amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B). 
79. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, § 105, 92 Stat. at 1790 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2006)). 
80. The judges referred to are members of a special court, known as the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is made up of a select group of 
federal district court judges.  Id. § 103(a), 92 Stat. at 1788 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2006)).  FISA also provides for a second 
court, comprised of three federal district or appellate judges, which reviews 
the denial of FISA applications.  Id. § 103(b), 92 Stat. at 1788 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2006)). 
81. Id. § 105(a)(1)-(2), 92 Stat. at 1790 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1805(a)(1) (2006)). 
82. Id. § 105(a)(3), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 
1805(a)(2) (2006)). 
83. Id. § 105(a)(4), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 
1805(a)(3) (2006)). 
84. Id. § 105(a)(5), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 
17
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requirement differs from that usually required for Fourth 
Amendment searches or seizures, including electronic 
surveillance.  The issuing judge must determine, based on the 
application, that there is probable cause that ―the target of the 
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power . . . [and that the telephone or location] is being 
used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent.‖85  
Other provisions of Section 105 concern more technical and 
formal requirements, including specifications in the judicial 
order such as periods of authorized use,86 retention and use 
requirements,87 emergency authorizations,88 testing of 
equipment,89 and liability issues.90  The limitation of this 
probable cause requirement is important.  In contrast to 
probable cause requirements in criminal investigations, there 
is no requirement that the judge find probable cause that the 
electronic surveillance will actually provide any foreign 
intelligence.  Rather, the requirement is simply a probable 
cause finding that the target is a foreign power or agent.  The 
connection between the nature of the target (the judicial 
finding) to the information important to national security is 
entirely contained in the certification requirements of Section 
104.  As noted above, a senior administration official must 
certify ―that the certifying official deems the information 
sought to be foreign intelligence information . . . and that a 
significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign 
 
1805(4) (2006)). 
85. Id. § 105(a)(3)(A)-(B), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 
1805(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2006)).  The omitted language within the quote is a proviso 
that prohibits concluding that a United States person is a foreign power or 
agent ―solely upon the basis of‖ protected First Amendment activities.  Id. § 
105(a)(3)(A), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) 
(2006)). 
86. Id. § 105(d), 92 Stat. at 1791 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 
1805(d) (2006)). 
87. Id. § 105(g), 92 Stat. at 1793 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(g) (2006)). 
88. Id. § 105(e), 92 Stat. at 1791-92 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 
1805(e) (2006)). 
89. Id. § 105(f)(1), 92 Stat. at 1792 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f)(1) 
(2006)). 
90. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 225, 115 Stat. 272, 295-96 (current version at 50 
U.S.C. § 1805(h) (2006)). 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
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intelligence information.‖91  Thus, the required connection to 
suspicious behavior is entirely based on the government‘s 
purpose. 
 
3.  What Was Not Subject to FISA 
 
The gaps in FISA are significant.  As enacted, the law 
governed only electronic surveillance of communications with a 
clear connection to the United States.  This was consistent with 
executive branch policy throughout the last thirty years, policy 
that holds that international use of most investigative 
techniques, including electronic surveillance, is exempt from 
constitutional regulation and should remain exempt from 
congressional oversight.92  Thus, FISA elaborated on the 
categories recognized in Keith.  Some international intelligence 
operations came under this regulatory scheme,93 while others 
apparently remained subject only to executive supervision.  
 
91. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(A)-(B) (2006).  See also 50 U.S.C. § 
1823(a)(6)(B). 
92. This fit into Keith‘s rationale, which held that domestic electronic 
surveillance was not permitted by Congress in the 1968 law, but which was 
subject to constitutional requirements akin, if not identical, to those 
attending criminal law electronic surveillance.  The Bush administration also 
took the view that any attempt by Congress to regulate international use of 
investigative techniques, at least in the context of the war on terrorism, 
would be an unconstitutional infringement on the Commander-in-Chief 
power.  See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, to Majority 
Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2006/nsa-
white-paper.pdf.  See also John Cary Sims, How the Bush Administration’s 
Warrantless Surveillance Program Took the Constitution on an Illegal, 
Unnecessary, and Unrepentant Joyride, 12 UCLA J. INT‘L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 
163 (2007). 
93. More recently, supporters of broad executive power have argued that 
any congressional regulation of intelligence surveillance is unconstitutional.  
See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), 
available at http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/doj11906wp.pdf.  This is fine 
as a matter of governmental theory.  There is not a lot of law to support this 
view, however, other than United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 
U.S. 304 (1936).  That case includes language that on its face supports robust 
executive powers in the international sphere.  Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 
320.  The underlying premise of Curtiss-Wright, however, is that the 
President is supreme with respect to carrying out international aspects of 
U.S. law, such as conducting relations with foreign nations—not with respect 
to making United States international law.  The decision itself upheld 
congressional action authorizing executive action, much as FISA does.  Id. at 
312-22. 
19
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Domestic intelligence investigation, such as that involved in 
Keith, presumably remained subject to Title III and would be 
permitted only upon meeting the demanding standards of that 
statute. 
Over the years, additional gaps in FISA have been 
discovered, and some have been filled.  For example, new 
technologies, such as email communications and cell-phones, 
have necessitated statutory amendments to expand 
investigative powers.94  This was a major issue in the early 
years of the War on Terrorism, when the Bush Administration 
credibly argued that FISA was outdated.95 
The most notable gap, however, would seem to be that 
FISA does not cover criminal investigations, even those that 
might involve foreign powers or international terrorists.  This 
was not an oversight.  Title III still applies to criminal 
investigations and, in fact, specifically provides for court-
ordered electronic surveillance under traditional standards for 
many federal crimes generally committed by foreign agents or 
terrorists.96  Most telling is the fact that Title III was amended 
after FISA was enacted to include some of these crimes, 
including crimes that, by definition, involve international 
terrorism.97  The difference between FISA and Title III is that 
 
94. See, e.g., United and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-
PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 282 
(codified as amending 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2006)) (granting roving 
surveillance authority to FISA intercept orders to allow agents to follow a 
target‘s communications without additional court action where the target 
changes communication services).  See also Orin S. Kerr, Updating the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (2008) 
(discussing the need to modernize FISA); Robert A. Pikowsky, An Overview of 
the Law of Electronic Surveillance Post September 11, 2001, 94 L. LIBR. J. 601 
(2002). 
95. See, e.g., Concerning the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: 
Hearing on S. 2248 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, National 
Security Division, Department of Justice), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/docs/final-wainstein-sjc-testimony-
103007.pdf; Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed., A FISA Fix, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2007, at 31; Eric Lichtblau, Deal is Struck to Overhaul Wiretap Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 2008, at A1. 
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2006) (providing for use of Title III 
electronic surveillance for crimes including espionage, sabotage, violence at 
international airports, and terrorist attacks). 
97. See id. § 2516(q) (providing that Title III orders are permitted for 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
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FISA applies to investigations that seek foreign intelligence, 
while Title III applies to those that are essentially attempts to 
collect evidence for criminal prosecution.  This is the only 
reading consistent with the case law of the period, Keith and 
Truong. 
 
B. FISA Over the Years 
 
1.  The Judicial Response 
 
Although Truong is heavily cited, as discussed above, it 
addressed pre-FISA electronic surveillance, and is therefore 
most applicable to claims of inherent presidential power.  
Several other circuit court decisions did, however, address the 
meaning and application of FISA after its enactment.  One 
such case is United States v. Duggan, which reviewed a 
conviction based in part on FISA electronic surveillance of 
Provisional Irish Republican Army members who came to the 
United States to obtain weapons and other items for use in 
paramilitary actions in Northern Ireland.98  That court 
considered several constitutional challenges to FISA.99  It noted 
that prior to FISA, courts were generally supportive of a 
presidential power to conduct warrantless electronic 
surveillance in the foreign intelligence sphere.100  It also 
accurately described Keith as limited to domestic surveillance 
and signaling approval of a flexible application of the Fourth 
Amendment in the intelligence sphere.101  The court then 
reasoned that FISA was Congress‘ attempt to take up the 
Supreme Court‘s suggestion in Keith concerning flexible 
application and to resolve Fourth Amendment questions in the 
intelligence sphere through the complex machinery of the 
 
crimes related to the use of chemical weapons and various additional crimes 
relating to terrorism). 
98. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 65-67 (2d Cir. 1984). 
99. See, e.g., id. at 71-75 (presenting arguments that the law was so 
broad and vague as to deny due process, that it violated the Fourth 
Amendment by not requiring probable cause of criminal conduct, and that it 
violated Equal Protection by providing less protection to lawful non-resident 
aliens than to citizens and resident aliens; the court refused to bite at any of 
these arguments). 
100. Id. at 72. 
101. Id. at 72-73. 
21
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statute.102  Using constitutional interest-balancing, the court 
concluded that FISA‘s procedures reflected a reasonable 
balance of rights and intelligence needs.103  Thus, the court 
upheld the law and acknowledged that there was no probable 
cause requirement if the surveillance ―will in fact lead to the 
gathering of foreign intelligence information.‖104  The court also 
upheld the in camera review of the affidavits and certifications 
to determine compliance with FISA and the Fourth 
Amendment.105 
The Duggan court briefly referred to the ―other purposes‖ 
issue, concluding that courts should generally accept the 
government‘s certifications on the issue of purpose.106  The 
court understood that there is a logical connection between 
intelligence information and evidence of criminal behavior, and 
seemed to see this as a reason to allow both the surveillance for 
intelligible purposes, along with the use of its resulting 
evidence in criminal prosecutions.107  The court did recognize 
that there would be room for challenges, however, concluding 
that general Fourth Amendment doctrine concerning false 
assertions in search warrant paperwork would be applicable.108  
Accordingly, it indicated that a false assertion that the 
electronic surveillance was for foreign intelligence would be a 
violation of FISA.109  It would necessarily also be a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, as the combined effect of Keith and 
FISA meant that domestic electronic surveillance would be 
 
102. Id. at 73. 
103. Id. at 72-73.  Of particular note, the court recognized that the 
probable cause findings relate to the target‘s status and use of the telephone 
or other instrument of electronic surveillance.  Id. 
104. Id. at 73. 
105. Id. at 78. 
106. Id. at 77. 
107. ―Finally, we emphasize that otherwise valid FISA surveillance is 
not tainted simply because the government can anticipate that the fruits of 
such surveillance may later be used, as recognized in 1806(b), as evidence in 
a criminal trial.‖  Id. at 78. 
108. Id. at 77.  The court referred to Franks v. Delaware and by analogy 
required a person challenging a FISA purpose certification ―to make ‗a 
substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and 
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included‘ in the 
application and that the allegedly false statement was ‗necessary‘ to the FISA 
Judge‘s approval of the application.‖  Id. (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)). 
109. Id. 
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outside the parameters of both FISA and Title III, and 
therefore unconstitutional.110 
  
2.  The Wall 
 
Based in part on Truong and other cases even more 
explicit about the purpose limitation of FISA, the government 
began to carefully limit access by criminal investigators and 
prosecutors to intelligence obtained in FISA electronic 
surveillance, and vice versa.  The rationale of this ―wall,‖ as it 
became known, was to protect both types of government 
investigations.  Information obtained under FISA would not be 
shared with criminal investigators in many instances in order 
to protect criminal cases from being ―tainted,‖ should it later be 
determined that its use was inappropriate.  The purpose of the 
wall in the other direction is less obvious.111 
David Kris, who served in a senior capacity at the Justice 
Department in the early years of the Bush Administration–the 
period in which the wall was largely dismantled—argues that 
the wall was never required by law.112  He traces the path by 
which all three branches of government, including both 
Republican and Democratic presidential administrations, 
 
110. Other courts of the pre-2001 period tended to follow Truong and 
accept the ―primary purpose‖ theory.  See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 952 
F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 
(11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 247, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (decided by future Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey).  But cf. 
United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988) (addressing but not 
deciding the issue). 
111. FISA would not apply to those investigations, but arguments could 
be built on the limitations on use of Title III electronic surveillance and grand 
jury evidence to prevent consideration in intelligence, as opposed to law 
enforcement, matters. 
112. Kris served as Associate Deputy Attorney General during the Bush 
Administration, and now serves as Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security.  See U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, National Security Division: Mission and 
Function, www.justice.gov/nsd/bio.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).  He has 
written a detailed study of the wall.  See David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of 
the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 487 (2006).  Kris is no supporter of 
the wall, but his description of its history is more measured than that of most 
articles by people on either side of such hot-button topics.  Kris was a 
litigator in the case that supposedly ended the wall, see In re Sealed Case, 
310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), and he describes himself as one of its 
principal authors, Kris, supra, at 487 n.* (unnumbered footnote), but his view 
on the underlying flaw in the wall was not adopted by that court. 
23
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created largely separate intelligence and law enforcement 
tracks.113  The most notable point in this history was in 1995, 
when the Department of Justice‘s Office of Legal Counsel 
issued a memorandum concluding that the wall was central to 
convincing courts that a foreign intelligence electronic 
surveillance satisfied the primary purpose test.114  This 
memorandum was soon followed by a March memorandum 
from Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick,115 as well as 
by a July memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno116 
on policies and procedures for coordinating law enforcement 
and foreign intelligence investigations.  In general, these 
documents accepted the primary purpose requirement, and 
therefore directed that foreign intelligence electronic 
surveillance be limited to matters in which obtaining such 
intelligence was the primary purpose.117  The documents then 
went beyond the apparent legal requirements by limiting 
disclosure and minimizing reliance on joint investigative 
teams.118  Kris argues that, while the Department of Justice 
policies encouraged coordination in some respects, their 
practical effects were to limit coordination.119  Early in the 
Bush Administration, several policy changes served to enhance 
coordination, but most aspects of the wall still remained in 
place in September 2001.120 
The existence of the wall and the impact of limiting 
information concerning terrorist activities became a major 
controversy after the September 11 attacks.  The Department 
of Justice issued new guidelines permitting much more contact 
 
113. Kris, supra note 112, at 499-506. 
114. Id. at 499 & n.69 (citing Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, 
Assistant Attorney General for the Office of the Legal Counsel, to Michael 
Vatis, Deputy Director, Executive Office for National Security (Feb. 14, 1995) 
(on file with Kris)). 
115. See id. at 501 & n.79 (citing Memorandum from Jaime S. Gorelick, 
Deputy Attorney General, to Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney, Southern District 
of New York et al. (March 1995), 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/testimony/2004/1995_gorelick_memo.pdf). 
116. See id. at 504 & n.99 (citing Memorandum from Janet Reno, 
Attorney General, to Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division et 
al. (July 19, 1995), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html). 
117. Id. at 501-06. 
118. Id. at 503. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 507-08. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
644 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
between investigative and intelligence operatives.121  Attorney 
General Ashcroft also chose to raise the issue during his 
testimony before the September 11 Commission, as he accused 
Gorelick, by then a member of the Commission, of 
responsibility for intelligence lapses leading to the attacks as a 
result of her role in establishing the wall.122 
 
3.  The 1995 Authorization of Surreptitious Searches 
 
In 1995, Congress amended FISA to permit physical 
searches within the United States under standards and 
procedures similar to those applicable to electronic 
surveillance.123  Thus, intelligence officers could conduct actual 
entries into private buildings, including homes, without 
meeting the probable cause standard generally applicable to 
criminal searches.  Such searches could occur over a period of 
up to one year, even without judicial approval, if the premises 
were not those of a covered ―U.S. person.‖124  The most 
noteworthy aspect of such searches is not the absence of the 
traditional probable cause requirement, or the fairly limited 
judicial role.125  Instead, it is the fact that the searches are by 
 
121. See id. at 507-11. 
122. See ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH‘S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 269-73 (2009).  The book by Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, Chairs 
of the 9/11 Commission, addresses some of the Commission‘s conflicts with 
Ashcroft on various issues.  See THOMAS H. KEAN & LEE H. HAMILTON, 
WITHOUT PRECEDENT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION (2006).  The 
Chairs found Ashcroft to be very hard to deal with, perhaps because of leaks 
criticizing him that came from inside the Commission.  Id. at 194.  He stage-
managed his testimony very dramatically, as evidenced by his refusal to 
provide written copies of his formal statement before reading it on national 
television.  Id.  While all witnesses defended their own turf and criticized 
others to some degree, Kean and Hamilton characterize Ashcroft as the most 
defensive and antagonistic witness, and argue that he attacked Gorelick far 
beyond what the record could support.  Id. at 194-96.  They argue that he 
changed facts to manipulate public reaction, and note that even the 
Republicans on the Commission would not accept his assertions.  Id. at 196.  
They also claim that President Bush disapproved of this behavior, indicated 
that it would stop, and largely ignored Ashcroft after his confrontation with 
the Commission.  Id. at 208-10. 
123. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 
103-359, § 807, 108 Stat. 3423, 3443-3453 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 
1822-29 (2006)). 
124. 50 U.S.C. § 1822(a)(1) (2006). 
125. The statute provides for the contents of the application to the FISA 
25
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their nature surreptitious.  The multiple entries and year-long 
authorization periods established by the statute necessarily 
mean that entries will be secret and unreported to the owner or 
occupant, conceivably forever.  The statute provides for notice 
only after the end of the national security interest.126 
These so-called ―sneak and peek‖ searches are not limited 
to intelligence matters.  They have been permitted since the 
1979 Supreme Court decision of Dalia v. United States, which 
authorized surreptitious physical entries in connection with 
installation of electronic surveillance equipment.127  Still, 
outside of the foreign intelligence setting, such searches are 
carefully limited in several respects.  Traditional probable 
cause is a requirement, as is notice, although it comes after a 
delay.128 
 
court, including, as amended in 2001, the ―significant purpose‖ requirement 
and the findings required in the order authorizing the search.  United and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. 
II, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291, amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 
1823(a)(7)(B) (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B)). 
126. 50 U.S.C. § 1825(b) (2006).  This portion of FISA contains many 
other detailed provisions on physical searches, including notifications when 
U.S. persons are involved, suppression standards, and in camera review.  Id. 
§ 1825. 
127. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979).  The Court interpreted 
Title III as authorizing surreptitious entry for the purpose of installing and 
maintaining the court-ordered listening device, noting that ―[t]he plain effect 
of the detailed restrictions of § 2518 is to guarantee that wiretapping or 
bugging occurs only when there is a genuine need for it and only to the extent 
that it is needed.‖  Id. at 250. 
128. See Section 3101a of Title 18 of the United States Code, which was 
enacted as part of the USA-PATRIOT Act: 
 
Delay—With respect to the issuance of any warrant or 
court order . . . to search for and seize any property or 
material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense . . . 
any notice required . . . may be delayed if . . . the court finds 
reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate 
notification of the execution of the warrant may have an 
adverse result . . . [;] the warrant prohibits the seizure of 
any tangible property, any wire or electronic communication 
. . . , except where the court finds reasonable necessity for 
the seizure; and . . . the warrant provides for the giving of 
such notice within a reasonable period not to exceed 30 days 
after the date of its execution, or on a later date certain if 
the facts of the case justify a longer period of delay. 
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C. The USA-PATRIOT Act Amendment 
 
1.  The Statutory Change 
 
As noted above, the USA-PATRIOT Act included a 
provision that was intended to break down the wall.  According 
to Assistant Attorney General Kris, after the September 11 
attacks, the Department of Justice sent to Congress an 
amendment to FISA that would allow foreign intelligence 
electronic surveillance when ―a purpose‖ rather than ―the 
purpose‖ of the electronic surveillance or surreptitious search 
was to obtain foreign intelligence information.129  Congress 
later changed the standard, opting for ―a significant purpose,‖ 
which was far more limited than the Department had wanted, 
but significantly more generous than the previous statutory 
requirement that ―the‖ purpose be to obtain foreign intelligence 
information.130  This would seem likely to change the test that 
has been followed in most courts, which requires that 
intelligence be the primary purpose of the investigation. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3101a(b)(1)-(3) (2006).  The ―adverse result‖ is defined in Section 
2705 of Title 18 and includes: ―(1) endangering the life or physical safety of 
an individual; (2) flight from prosecution; (3) destruction of or tampering with 
evidence; (4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (5) otherwise seriously 
jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.‖  § 2705(a)(2).  These 
reasons are intrinsically different from those applicable to surreptitious FISA 
searches, which are, as they should be, focused on gaining information about 
foreign intelligence. 
129. Kris, supra note 112, at 508 (emphasis added) (discussing the USA-
PATRIOT Act‘s amendments to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (now 
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B) (2006)).  By this time, of 
course, the change would also allow greater use of physical searches.  See 
discussion supra Part I(B)(3). 
130. On changes to FISA and other statutes governing investigative 
powers during this period, see ANNA C. HENNING & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
ACT (FISA) SET TO EXPIRE IN 2009 (2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509762&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; GINA 
MARIE STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRIVACY: AN 
ABBREVIATED OUTLINE OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND 
ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/98-326.pdf; Robert Bloom & William J. Dunn, 
The Congressional Infirmity of Warrantless NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of 
Presidential Power and the Injury to the Fourth Amendment, 15 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 147 (2006); Burton, supra note 60; Pikowsky, supra note 94. 
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This subtle distinction was potentially important.  Under 
the previous test, the main purpose had to be intelligence 
gathering—the government had to be seeking information to 
help in its future responses to international developments or 
terrorism.  Collection of evidence for criminal prosecution was 
welcome and could be anticipated if the targets revealed their 
involvement in actions punishable under U.S. criminal law, but 
obtaining such evidence could not be the primary objective.  
The wall, of course, was one way of indicating adherence to this 
principle.  Agents from the intelligence side dominated the 
planning and execution of FISA surveillance, and information 
was shared with criminal investigators only where it could be 
established that such action was subsidiary to a dominant 
intelligence purpose.131  Under the revised version, apparently 
the only requirement was that the agents establish that 
seeking foreign intelligence was a non-trivial part of the 
enterprise.132  This would seem self-evident in most cases.  As 
such, the wall was anachronistic, at least as far as FISA was 
concerned.  The Department responded by dismantling the wall 
internally to some degree, and then by seeking to have the 
FISC modify requirements in FISA orders to reflect the greater 
power of the government to share information obtained in 
electronic surveillance.133 
 
2.  Judicial Responses to the 2001 Amendment 
 
The battle over the 2001 amendment began in earnest in 
 
131. The wall operated in slightly different ways during different 
periods.  See Kris, supra note 112, at 499-505 (―History of the FISA Wall‖ 
through USA-PATRIOT Act amendment to FISA). 
132. Kris addresses several ramifications of the wall, addressing both 
civil liberties and security concerns.  Kris, supra note 112, at 518-21.  The 
wall is largely irrelevant to who is subject to surveillance and what 
information is sought or intercepted.  Id. at 519.  FISA targets usually 
commit crimes relevant to espionage or terror, but could also commit 
unrelated crimes.  Kris suggests non-international or non-terrorism crimes, 
such as child pornography or theft, both of which often involve computers and 
communication systems.  Id. at 519-20.  A prosecutor might want to 
scrutinize a target‘s email accounts for both types of offenses.  There can be 
legitimate national security reasons to pursue unrelated offenses by national 
security targets, if only because additional criminal liability might result in a 
cooperative witness rather than a silent defendant.  Id. at 520-23. 
133. This is described, from an insider‘s perspective, in Kris, supra note 
112, at 510-11. 
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2002 when the FISC issued a general order restricting the 
Department of Justice‘s use of FISA to investigations not 
primarily intended for criminal prosecution.134  The conflict 
arose in the context of motions by the Department of Justice to 
vacate minimization and wall procedures in matters then 
before the FISC.  The FISC approved some of the government‘s 
requested changes but denied others.  Rather than permit the 
fairly unregulated joint operation of intelligence and law 
enforcement investigations requested by the Department of 
Justice, the court ruled that the following language should be 
included in FISA orders: 
 
The FBI, the Criminal Division, and [the 
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review] may 
consult with each other to coordinate their efforts 
to investigate or protect against foreign attack or 
other grave hostile acts, sabotage, international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities by 
foreign powers or their agents.  Such 
consultations and coordination may address, 
among other things, exchanging information 
already acquired . . . and overall strategy of both 
investigations in order to ensure that the 
overlapping intelligence and criminal interests of 
the United States are both achieved. . . . [[T]he 
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review] shall be 
invited to all such consultations, and if they are 
unable to attend, [they] shall be apprised of the 
substance of the consultations forthwith in 
writing so that the Court may be notified at the 
earliest opportunity. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, law 
enforcement officials shall not make 
recommendations to intelligence officials 
concerning the initiation, operation, continuation 
or expansion of FISA searches or surveillances.  
Additionally, the FBI and the Criminal Division 
 
134. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (FISA Ct. 2002). 
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shall ensure that law enforcement officials do not 
direct or control the use of FISA procedures to 
enhance criminal prosecution . . . .135 
 
The key language, of course, was the ban on law 
enforcement officials taking a supervisory role, which might 
suggest that criminal enforcement rather than intelligence 
collection purposes were dominant.  In effect, the court 
partially reversed the Department‘s decision to lower the wall, 
but acted through the minimization requirements of FISA, 
rather than through the ―intelligence purpose‖ requirement.136 
These provisions were included in two electronic 
surveillance orders issued later that year, and the Department 
of Justice appealed to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review (―FISCR‖).137  That court overturned the 
FISC‘s restrictions in a decision that took the lower court to 
task.  First, the FISCR reached out to decide that the use of the 
wall was inappropriate, even under the original text of FISA 
that was enacted in 1978.138  This was unnecessary because the 
court‘s interpretation of the amended version of the statute 
would have itself resolved all issues pertinent to the dispute, 
and the Department of Justice had not even made this broader 
argument in the court below.  Nevertheless, the FISCR 
addressed the history of surveillance authorizations under 
FISA and concluded that nothing in the original statute 
mandated the high wall imposed by the Department and, now, 
by the FISC.139  The FISCR concluded that Truong was 
inapplicable to FISA cases and had been blindly followed, 
rather than intelligently applied, in the federal appellate cases 
that followed it by adopting the ―primary purpose‖ test.140 
The FISCR then addressed the status of joint 
―intelligence/criminal‖ investigations under the 2001 
amendments to FISA.  It concluded that the statutory revision 
 
135. Id. at 625. 
136. See id. at 616-20 (characterizing action as part of minimization 
requirements). 
137. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
138. Id. at 722-28. 
139. Id. at 723-25. 
140. Id. at 725-28. 
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resolved any doubt on this issue.141  This allowed the 
government to use FISA procedures in cases in which criminal 
prosecution was in fact the primary motivation of the 
investigation.  The FISCR stated that ―the Patriot Act 
amendment, by using the word ―significant,‖ eliminated any 
justification for the FISA court to balance the relative weight 
the government places on criminal prosecution as compared to 
other counterintelligence responses.‖142  The opinion concluded 
by reexamining these issues through the prism of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Here the FISCR found the FISA process lawful 
as long as the government was in fact acting through its 
foreign intelligence powers.143  That is, as long as the 
government was seeking information on foreign intelligence as 
defined in FISA, it could use the more lenient procedures 
permitted by FISA rather than the traditional requirements 
imposed in criminal investigations.144 
The two courts therefore confronted similar, yet different, 
issues.  The FISC looked to minimization, a statutory 
requirement that had not been changed from the original FISA 
provisions, and which required that electronic surveillance be 
conducted so as to minimize the intrusion on U.S. persons, 
largely by limiting disclosure and use of intercepted 
conversations (and evidence discovered in surreptitious 
searches).145  Accordingly, the FISC limited the disclosure and 
 
141. Id. at 728-38. 
142. Id. at 735. 
143. Id. at 736-37. 
144. Id. at 745.  Kris‘s argument, which was part of the government‘s 
argument to the FISCR, was that there was no dichotomy between law 
enforcement and foreign intelligence searches because the President has the 
constitutional authority to act to protect national security through law 
enforcement, and therefore, the less demanding FISA procedures apply to 
criminal investigations conducted in order to protect national security.  Kris, 
supra note 112, at 519-23.  The short answer to this point is that, just as the 
President and Congress have powers with respect to criminal prosecutions for 
offenses such as counterfeiting or piracy, their choice to use the criminal 
processes means that the constitutional (and other) laws relating to the 
criminal process are presumably applicable.  In other words, a presidential 
decision to use the criminal law to achieve national objectives beyond law 
enforcement does not eliminate the Fourth Amendment‘s requirement of 
reasonable searches and seizures any more than it permits evading the First 
Amendment‘s rights of free speech or the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment. 
145. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 (FISA Ct. 2002). 
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use of those conversations for non-foreign intelligence 
purposes.146  On appeal, the FISCR, however, largely accepted 
the Department of Justice‘s argument that the modification of 
FISA by the USA-PATRIOT Act eliminated any need to 
separate intelligence investigations from dual purpose 
intelligence/criminal investigations.147 
The few cases that have addressed this issue indicate a 
trend to accept the FISCR analysis of In re Sealed Case.  The 
Seventh Circuit adopted this reasoning in United States v. 
Ning Wen.148  Three 2008 federal district court decisions also 
upheld the view that the USA-PATRIOT Act amendment was 
constitutional and that the law now permits the use of FISA to 
collect evidence for criminal prosecutions.149  As of August 
2009, the only noteworthy decision to the contrary is a district 
court decision involving Brandon Mayfield, the Oregon 
attorney mentioned in this article‘s Introduction, who was 
wrongly accused of involvement in the 2004 Madrid train 
bombing.150  That decision held that the 2001 amendment was 
unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment grounds, essentially 
finding that the authorization to engage in intrusive searches 
of criminal suspects without probable cause of criminal activity 
rendered the law unconstitutional even where there is a factual 
connection to an intelligence purpose.151 
There is little reason to doubt that the FISCR‘s view will 
prevail, at least in the short run.  The primary purpose test 
had a long pedigree, but the USA-PATRIOT Act constituted a 
 
146. Id. at 617. 
147. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 722, 732.  It is fair to conclude that 
neither court had it quite right.  While minimization is required by statute as 
well as, arguably, the Fourth Amendment—for at least some FISA 
surveillance—the FISC‘s broad generic ruling did not respond to the real 
issue.  The FISCR, on the other hand, had the right issue—law enforcement 
purposes for FISA surveillance—but overlooked the constitutional line drawn 
by the Supreme Court between law enforcement and special needs searches.  
See generally discussion infra Part III. 
148. United States v. Ning Wen, 477 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2007). 
149. One, of course, is United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299 
(D. Conn. 2008).  See also United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. 
Minn. 2008); United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 
2007). 
150. Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007), 
vacated, 588 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2009). 
151. Id. at 1042. 
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congressional willingness to loosen the requirement.  On top of 
that, until 2002, federal courts had no FISCR precedent to 
draw upon, and Truong and other cases dealing with the 
original FISA therefore became the basic decisions in the field.  
With the FISCR ruling, however, the precedent now comes 
from a court with specific delegated authority to decide FISA 
issues,152 and it is unlikely that the Oregon precedent in 
Mayfield will convince many other lower courts.  Perhaps more 
significantly, the FISCR decision is from a court with 
nationwide jurisdiction and which provides the primary 
appellate judicial supervision of the FISA process.  As such, 
decisions to the contrary, such as Mayfield, may seem to be 
trivial outliers to other courts.  FISA judges are themselves 
bound to follow the precedent of In re Sealed Case, and 
government agents involved in FISA investigations will have 
every reason to follow the ―law‖ of the FISCR.153  For example, 
one court that took other constitutional and statutory 
challenges to government actions in an intelligence 
investigation very seriously treated this challenge to the use of 
FISA evidence as insignificant.154  As shown below, while this 
is arguably consistent with traditional Fourth Amendment law, 
 
152. There is somewhat of a practical anomaly here, however, as the 
seven FISA judges who agreed to the ruling in In re All Matters had probably 
much more experience under the law than the three judges on the FISCR 
who reversed that ruling.  In re Sealed Case was the first appeal considered 
by the FISCR.  310 F.3d at 719.  The seven judges of the FISC all concurred 
in All Matters.  218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 625 (FISA Ct. 2002).  During the seven 
years preceding the 2002 litigation, FISC judges had considered—and 
approved—over 5000 applications for FISA orders.  See Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders 1979-2007, 
http;//epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (last visited Feb. 14, 
2010). 
153. There is also reason to believe that the government could more 
readily evade facing courts that may lean toward Mayfield through venue 
selection.  In contrast to criminal investigations under Title III, in which the 
circuit law that narrows government authority in a particular area must be 
followed within the districts that make up the circuit, here the FISCR would 
seem to set the law under which surveillance is conducted.  At most, adverse 
circuit law would preclude criminal prosecutions based on evidence obtained 
during the electronic surveillance within those jurisdictions. 
154. In Turkmen v. Ashcroft, the court simply drew an analogy to 
routine criminal searches and concluded that there is no credible objection to 
using in a criminal setting evidence obtained through national security 
electronic surveillance.  Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02CV2307(JG), 2006 WL 
1662663, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006), aff’d, rev’d on other grounds per 
curiam, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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there are credible arguments to the contrary, and the courts 
should not blindly follow In re Sealed Case any more than they 
should have blindly followed Truong. 
 
II.  Foreign Intelligence Searches in the  
Fourth Amendment Universe 
 
A. Special Needs 
 
This structure established by FISA, to allow electronic 
surveillance where foreign intelligence is a significant purpose 
of the action, is arguably consistent with the prevailing law 
concerning Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.  In a 
series of decisions over the last thirty years, the Supreme 
Court has approved searches and seizures, and later use of 
resulting evidence in court, where the government had acted 
for a legitimate, non-law-enforcement reason, even where the 
government did not meet traditional Fourth Amendment 
requirements.155  This is the ―special needs‖ exception to the 
warrant and probable cause requirements.  If the action is 
―reasonable‖ under the Fourth Amendment, then the intrusion 
is lawful.156  Because the action is lawful under the Fourth 
Amendment, there is no reason to exclude the resulting 
evidence in criminal trials. 
There are at least two legs to this principle in operation.  
One is that courts are reluctant to second guess law 
enforcement motives.  If a government agent has a lawful basis 
to search, the courts will not invalidate the search or bar use of 
the seized evidence just because the officer took advantage of 
that basis to search, even though the officer hoped or 
anticipated finding evidence for a criminal prosecution.  
Another, sometimes related, principle is the Plain View 
Doctrine, in which the courts allow the seizure of evidence 
discovered under one rationale when there is some second 
reason that allows its seizure.157  These notions arguably come 
 
155. See generally infra notes 159-82 and accompanying text. 
156. See Anthony C. Coveny, When the Immovable Object Meets the 
Unstoppable Force: Search and Seizure in the Age of Terrorism, 31 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 329 (2007). 
157. See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text. 
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together in the Pretense Search Doctrine, in which the courts 
conclude that police officers may take advantage of reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to stop a car for a vehicular 
violation while intending to look for evidence of more serious 
crimes.158  While these doctrines were hotly disputed when first 
recognized, and while they do present significant questions 
about the nature of Fourth Amendment protections, they are 
unlikely to be reconsidered unless there is a sea change on the 
Supreme Court.  Analyses of Fourth Amendment aspects of 
national security law must accordingly take them into account.  
To this end, the following section builds on ―special needs‖ law 
and these principles to provide an argument for dual purpose 
foreign intelligence/law enforcement electronic surveillance 
under FISA. 
The ―special needs‖ doctrine was largely undeveloped when 
Keith was decided.  The general principle developed in a series 
of cases in the late twentieth century, and is most closely 
associated with New Jersey v. T.L.O.159  Over time the courts 
have established four controlling factors: 1) the ―gravity of the 
public concerns‖ leading to the search or seizure, 2) the extent 
to which the search or seizure in fact advances those concerns, 
3) the severity of the intrusion, and 4) the existence of a non-
law enforcement purpose.160  There are several different ways 
of organizing the resulting case law, but the most applicable to 
foreign intelligence searches separates those settings that 
involve what appear to be traditional searches and which are 
reasonably likely to result in evidence that can be used in 
criminal cases, from other cases that are more obviously civil in 
nature.  The first quasi-criminal category can be distinguished 
from those that involve intrusions different in kind from law 
enforcement searches, such as drug tests,161 or those that only 
 
158. See infra notes 194-199 and accompanying text. 
159. The case involved a search of a high school student‘s purse by a 
school assistant principal who had reason to believe she had been smoking in 
the women‘s restroom in violation of school rules.  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325, 328 (1985). 
160. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).  In that case, police 
officers conducted a blockade near the scene of a fatal highway accident and 
handed out fliers in an attempt to locate witnesses to the incident.  As a 
result of the blockade, Lidster was discovered to be driving under the 
influence of alcohol.  Id. at 422. 
161. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives‘ Ass‘n, 489 U.S. 602 
(1989) (drug testing of employees in transportation industries); Nat‘l 
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indirectly involve government agents examining private items 
or information.162  By examining the four factors in the context 
of a quasi-traditional search such as electronic surveillance, the 
four factors largely devolve into a fairly raw balancing of two 
factors.  In order to argue for the exception, the purpose must 
not be law enforcement, so factor (4) is a ―yes/no‖ question that 
must be resolved prior to applying the rest of the test.  The first 
two parts of the test, factors (1) and (2), seem complementary 
and together add up to an overall evaluation of the value of 
such searches to the government.163  The severity of the 
intrusion, factor (3), is thus weighed against the value (both 
the abstract importance of the purpose and the degree aspects 
of parts (1) and (2)), in a manner typical of constitutional 
balancing tests. 
Border searches provide a good example of ―special needs‖ 
searches and reveal that they are not limited to new problems 
or new legal rules.164  A more recent example is air security 
searches.  The limitations on privacy in air travel began several 
decades ago with the rise of national security concerns, 
primarily the use of commercial aviation by hijackers to defect, 
or to otherwise engage in international terrorism.165  Such 
 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of 
government employees involved in law enforcement). 
162. This would seem to be the case with T.L.O. itself.  The Fourth 
Amendment was involved in a school‘s policy because the school was public, 
but the underlying policy of keeping contraband off school property was not 
inherently a law enforcement or even governmental policy, as private schools 
would be expected to impose the same or similar rules. 
163. This is reminiscent of the means/ends approach used in Due 
Process and Equal Protection—here, the overall purpose must be important 
and the intrusion must advance it to some unspecified degree.  See JOHN E. 
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ¶ 11.7 (8th ed. 2010) 
(identifying due process/fundamental rights standards of review); id. ¶ 14.3 
(identifying equal protection standards of review). 
164. The courts have confirmed that searches at the nation‘s borders are 
reasonable without warrants or probable cause due to the great national 
interest in protecting the nation from harmful persons or things entering or 
exiting the nation.  See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-
53 (2004).  While this power is an aspect of sovereignty and international law 
rather than law enforcement, the Fourth Amendment applies, but has very 
limited concern.  Searches may include examination of the contents of 
vehicles, containers, personal property, and the like.  See, e.g., Chehade Refal 
v. Lazaro, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1112-15 (D. Nev. 2009) (collecting cases). 
165. See generally James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Validity of Airport 
Security Measures, 125 A.L.R. 5th 281, § 2a (2005).  See also United States v. 
Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972) (early reliance on hijacker profile); United 
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concerns led to security measures at odds with traditional 
Fourth Amendment protections.  The primary use of evidence 
resulting from security searches, however, seems to be in 
enforcement of routine criminal laws.  Such searches are not 
undertaken for criminal law enforcement purposes, but are at 
least similar in operation to law enforcement searches.  Agents 
conducting air security searches look into private containers or 
on individuals themselves for weapons or other dangerous 
items.  Contraband drugs and dangerous weapons, typical of 
the items discovered during such searches, are routinely used 
as evidence in criminal cases.  Stated differently, a search of a 
suitcase at an airport security checkpoint does not differ much 
from a search of a suitcase during a criminal investigation 
except that the purpose is security rather than law 
enforcement.166 
Air security searches are now commonplace, as anyone 
who has traveled by air in recent years can attest.  They are 
also legally unimpeachable.  Typical of cases upholding air 
security searches is United States v. Edwards, decided in 1974, 
a time at which such searches were far more limited than in 
the post-2001 period.167  Edwards was an air passenger who 
had activated a magnetometer and became subject to a search 
of her carry-on baggage.168  In a bag, wrapped in highly 
personal items, the inspector found glassine envelopes that 
contained heroin.169  The majority engaged in a fairly simple 
interest-balancing analysis, and decided that the potential 
harm of air piracy was sufficiently grave to justify personal 
searches at airport gates to prevent passengers from taking 
 
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972) (reliance on magnetometer 
to identify potential hijackers). 
166. There are also serious privacy concerns about data mining of air 
passengers.  See, e.g., Stephen W. Dummer, Comment, Secure Flight and 
Data Veillance, A New Type of Civil Liberties Erosion: Stripping Your Rights 
When You Don’t Even Know It, 75 MISS. L.J. 583 (2006). 
167. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974).  See also 
United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006) (modern decision 
upholding airport security searches); United States v. Aukai, 440 F.3d 1168 
(9th Cir. 2006) (same); Buchwalter, supra note 165, §§ II(A)(4)-(7), (9)-(10) 
(collecting cases). 
168. Today, of course, all air passengers are subject to searches of carry-
ons and checked baggage, and at many airports, full body scans, somewhat 
akin to virtual strip searches, are used for many passengers. 
169. Edwards, 498 F.2d at 499. 
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dangerous items on-board.170  The judges used the balancing 
methodology then predominant to conclude that such 
intrusions are reasonable.171  Judge Friendly‘s majority opinion 
did note a reservation that foreshadowed the ―non-criminal 
purposes‖ requirement, that if ―the Government is abusing its 
authority‖ by using air security searches as a general means of 
enforcing the criminal law, the search would be invalid and the 
evidence inadmissible.172 
This exception is no longer limited to air security.  The 
Second Circuit considered a New York City policy of conducting 
random, suspicionless container searches of persons entering 
the subway system.173  The Court held that because the 
program was not a ―general means of enforcing the criminal 
law,‖ the validity of the search under the Fourth Amendment 
was measured under the far more lenient general balancing of 
costs and benefits.174  Here, the public interest in preventing 
attacks on the subways is obvious and compelling.  Given the 
then-even more recent international history of subway attacks, 
it is remarkable that there was any debate on the issue at 
all.175  Cases with little connection to international terrorism 
reveal the extent to which the expanded notion of 
governmental security search powers has pervaded the law.  
This concern arose in United States v. Va Lerie, in which 
cocaine was discovered in a search of a garment bag removed 
from a bus luggage compartment by a state police officer.176  
 
170. Id. at 500-01. 
171. Id.  A concurring opinion emphasized that Edwards and passengers 
generally consent to a search, by virtue of the postings at the airports.  Id. at 
504 (Oakes, J., concurring).  Other courts have also emphasized this consent 
notion.  See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 
1980).  See also Buchwalter, supra note 165, § 2(A)(12). 
172. Id. at 500. 
173. Macwade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006).  Coveny discusses 
Macwade at length, concluding that it may foreshadow a world of little 
privacy from such government intrusions, largely because the theoretical 
sufficiency of the ―special needs‖ concept appears to overlook important 
questions about the utility of such searches and the impact of such searches 
on privacy.  Coveny, supra note 156, at 331-34, 364-80. 
174. Macwade, 460 F.3d at 267-69. 
175. A similar analysis was applied by the same court to searches of 
passengers on Lake Champlain ferries.  Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
176. United States v. Va Lerie, 385 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 2004), rev’d en 
banc, 424 F.3d 694, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 903. 
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The constitutionality of the search seemed to turn on whether 
the bag had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The court held that it had, consistent with circuit 
precedent and normal understandings of the meaning of 
―seizure‖ under the Fourth Amendment.177  A dissenting judge 
argued, however, that such minor relocations should not 
constitute seizures, specifically noting two factors.178  First, he 
reminded the court that the conclusion would necessarily be 
different at an air terminal, as passenger luggage is controlled 
and subject to security examination without any concern about 
whether it has been ―seized.‖179  Second, he suggested that 
modern terrorism has changed the public‘s attitude that any 
baggage, even first-class checked luggage, is subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.180  The judge alluded to the 
privacy accorded persons and their belongings in air 
transportation, which has eroded over the decades and is now 
almost non-existent, presumably forever.181  The Madrid train 
attacks, subway attacks in England, and bus attacks in Israel 
all suggest that any distinction among forms of transportation 
is unjustified by both logic and experience.182  The purpose of 
protecting these common targets from terrorists necessarily 
translates into broader search powers. 
The FISCR now takes the position that FISA searches are 
constitutional under a special needs analysis.  In a 2008 
decision considering the validity of provisions in the Protect 
America Act of 2007, which required communications service 
providers to assist the government in conducting foreign 
intelligence electronic surveillance,183 the court decided that 
the special needs principle applies by analogy.184  While the 
 
177. Id. at 1146-49. 
178. Id. at 1151-56 (Riley, J., dissenting). 
179. Id. at 1156 (Riley, J., dissenting). 
180. Id. at 1151-56 (Riley, J., dissenting).  Both the district court and the 
dissenting judge on appeal referred to the impact of the September 11 attacks 
on privacy and government search powers.  See id. at 1157 n.10 (Riley, J., 
dissenting). 
181. See id. at 1157 n.10 (Riley, J., dissenting). 
182. Id. at 1157 n.10 (Riley, J., dissenting). 
183. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (to 
be codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
184. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). 
39
2010] “INTELLIGENCE” SEARCHES AND PURPOSE 659 
court reaffirmed the holding of In re Sealed Case, it concluded 
that the central concern was ―the programmatic purpose of the 
surveillances and whether–as in the special needs cases–that 
programmatic purpose involves some legitimate objective 
beyond ordinary crime control.‖185  As noted below, the court 
also recognized the need to consider the totality of the 
circumstances in order to apply the reasonableness 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.186 
 
B. Traditional Dual Purpose Searches 
 
Fourth Amendment law already acknowledges that 
government officers will sometimes change or add purposes in 
the course of their investigations.  Much of the case law on 
special needs searches is based upon this principle in action.  
While some cases consider the constitutionality of a particular 
government program in the context of a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to the program regardless of an attempt by criminal 
prosecutors to use evidence obtained in the search,187 most 
courts address the issue in the context of a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained during a non-law enforcement special needs 
search.  This was the issue in T.L.O., itself, and at least two of 
the important Supreme Court decisions concerning 
roadblocks.188 
This notion is also the underlying premise of the Plain 
View Doctrine, under which government officers are permitted 
to seize evidence that they discover while otherwise acting 
lawfully.189  A typical plain view seizure occurs when agents 
executing a search warrant for one offense discover evidence of 
a second offense.  The central requirement is that the officer is 
lawfully present where he or she locates the evidence that is 
 
185. Id. at 1011. 
186. Id. at 1012.  See infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
187. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives‘ Ass‘n, 489 U.S. 602 
(1989) (drug tests of transportation employees) and Michigan Dep‘t. of State 
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (D.U.I. roadblock). 
188. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of personal 
property to enforce school rules); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) 
(roadblock search for accident investigation); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border checkpoint search). 
189. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(a) (4th ed. 
2004). 
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seized.190  Thus, plain view seizures can occur when officers are 
performing non-law enforcement functions, such as 
community-care policing.191  There is no requirement that the 
discovery be inadvertent or in any way accidental.  Thus, it is 
entirely permissible for agents to hope and expect to find 
specific evidence, and then to seize it under the Plain View 
Doctrine.192  Viewing this doctrine through the national 
security purpose that underlies FISA, agents may permissibly 
―seize‖ and use evidence of crimes discovered while acting in 
their foreign intelligence capacity.  Just as an officer who 
notices illegal drugs during a D.U.I. roadblock or while 
conducting a traffic stop may seize those drugs and use them as 
evidence in a drug prosecution,193 so too may the intelligence 
officer take note of and use evidence of federal crimes 
committed by targets of FISA authorized electronic 
surveillance. 
The second leg supporting the use of security evidence in 
criminal prosecutions is that the courts rarely question the 
motivation of the officers in placing themselves at a location 
where they can make a plain view seizure.  This notion is 
illustrated by what can be called the Pretense Stop, as 
illustrated by the facts of Whren v. United States.194  In that 
case, police officers observed a car committing a moving 
violation and stopped the car to investigate, presumably in 
order to issue a citation.195  As in so many such cases, drugs 
were observed by the officer during the stop, and a drug seizure 
and arrest followed.196  The defendants challenged both the 
search and the seizure, arguing that the moving violation was 
 
190. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (finding that the 
officer was lawfully present because the search warrant was valid); Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (finding that the officer was not 
lawfully present because the search warrant that was executed was invalid). 
191. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). 
192. This was the case in Horton, in which police officers had a search 
warrant for the proceeds of a robbery, but failed to also seek a warrant for the 
weapons used in the crime.  The officers expected to seize the weapons, did 
so, and the courts upheld the seizures under the Plain View doctrine.  Horton, 
496 U.S. at 133-42. 
193. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
194. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
195. Id. at 808-09. 
196. Id. 
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so trivial that no reasonable officer would have stopped the car 
unless motivated to look for evidence of other crimes while at 
the driver‘s window, and that therefore, the plain view seizure 
was a sham.197  The allegation was credible given the nature of 
the traffic offense, its location, and the time of night, but the 
Supreme Court concluded that even if the stop was a pretense, 
that fact would be irrelevant to any challenge to the validity of 
the stop.198  The officers had probable cause of a violation, and 
therefore, their seizure of the vehicle during the traffic stop 
was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.199 
These theories all support the broad use of evidence 
discovered in FISA-authorized investigations in criminal cases.  
Stated simply, the argument is that as long as the action was 
lawful under FISA, it can be redefined as a ―special needs‖ 
program of searches and seizures, and therefore evidence 
discovered in ―plain view‖ during a FISA electronic surveillance 
may be used in criminal prosecutions of any type—even if the 
investigators were motivated by criminal, rather than 
intelligence, reasons in conducting their electronic surveillance. 
 
C. A Different Application of the Special Needs Doctrine 
 
This is not the only way to read Supreme Court decisions 
in this area.  In some ways, the most applicable Supreme Court 
decision is City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, which involved a 
challenge to an Indianapolis program of conducting motor 
vehicle checkpoints in order to prevent illegal drugs from 
coming into city neighborhoods.200  These facts are obviously 
very different from those surrounding foreign intelligence 
 
197. Id. at 809. 
198. Id. at 812-13. 
199. Id. at 819.  The ramifications of Whren are potentially quite broad.  
It seems to allow police officers to shadow suspected criminals and use the 
full force of arrest and search powers in any matter, no matter how trivial.  
This notion resonates in the setting of foreign intelligence surveillances, see 
infra Part IV(B)(4), and is consistent with the Bush administration‘s ―spit on 
the sidewalk‖ policy that targeted suspected terrorists, see ASHCROFT, supra 
note 24, at 124.  See also LICHTBLAU, supra note 122, at 58.  The ―spit on the 
sidewalk‖ reference is to Kennedy‘s commitment to prosecuting organized 
crime figures for any and all offenses, including trivial or otherwise rarely 
prosecuted violations.  See generally VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 
49-107 (1971). 
200. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
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searches, but the underlying premise is quite similar.  In 1998, 
the City of Indianapolis decided to conduct checkpoints at 
various points throughout the city in order ―to interdict illegal 
drugs.‖201  Cars were selected through a random process, police 
conducted brief conversations with the drivers and passengers, 
and the public was advised that the checkpoints would occur 
through highly visible public notices posted ahead of time.202  A 
six-justice majority invalidated the Indianapolis program.203  
Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion for the Court emphasized several 
points.  First, she noted that all previously approved 
checkpoints were based on reasons other than law 
enforcement.204  These were true ―special needs‖ cases, with 
objectives such as ensuring safety in transportation, workplace 
safety at dangerous or highly regulated industries, and 
protecting the nation‘s borders.205  Government searches with 
the ―general purpose of investigating crime‖ were 
distinguished, and since Indianapolis had the primary purpose 
of seizing illegal narcotics before they entered the community, 
the majority concluded it could not characterize the city‘s 
program as containing a non-law enforcement purpose—
notwithstanding the obvious public health and safety 
ramifications of illegal drug use.206  The Court acknowledged 
that, at some level of generality, all of the ―special needs‖ 
settings could be characterized as involving a law enforcement 
purpose, such as detecting the offense of driving under the 
influence.207  In a key passage, the Court distinguished Whren, 
which otherwise would have seemed to be the strongest basis 
for allowing Indianapolis‘s program.208  The Court noted, 
however, that Whren disapproved of looking to the purpose of 
the search only when there was objective probable cause of a 
 
201. Id. at 34. 
202. Id. at 34-36.  The procedures were generally consistent with those 
upheld in the context of a D.U.I. roadblock in Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
203. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 33. 
204. Id. at 37-40. 
205. See id. at 37. 
206. Id. at 41 (stating that ―[w]e have never approved a checkpoint 
program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing‖). 
207. Id. at 42-43. 
208. Id. at 45. 
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crime present.209  Where it is not present, as in the special 
needs context, courts must examine the programmatic 
purposes in order to determine whether what had occurred was 
a legitimate ―special needs‖ search, or a pretext for an 
unjustified criminal search.210  The Court also emphasized that 
a secondary, non-law-enforcement or special needs purpose 
would not be sufficient to legitimize a roadblock.211  It 
acknowledged the validity of security searches such as those 
conducted at airports and public buildings, but did not suggest 
that the existence of terrorism in general, or specific 
connections with international matters, exempted the 
government‘s action from these underlying principles.212 
Edmond is frustrating for scholars and courts trying to 
evaluate the ―purposes‖ connection between law enforcement 
and foreign intelligence.  In one sense the application of the 
decision in this setting is problematic.  Justice O‘Connor‘s 
opinion is typical of her style as much as Keith was typical of 
Justice Powell‘s.213  The majority opinion never hazarded 
beyond checkpoints or suspicionless stops, and it gave little 
indication of the broader canvas in which ―special needs‖ 
claims are appropriate.  The opinion asserted that there is a 
borderline between the law enforcement purpose of interdicting 
illegal drugs and the public safety justification of identifying 
dangerous drivers, but it did not really explain where it lies.  It 
seems likely that the Court would uphold a checkpoint in 
which officers distribute anti-drug public service brochures or 
otherwise communicate the dangers of illegal drug use,214 so 
 
209. Id. 
210. The Court emphasized that it was the purpose of the general 
program, implemented by government decision-makers, rather than that of 
individual officers conducting the checkpoint, that was pertinent.  Id. at 45-
46. 
211. Id. at 46-47.  If so, the Court reasoned, any criminal enforcement 
roadblock could be made lawful by inclusion of a legitimate special needs 
aspect, such as a license or sobriety check.  Id.  The Court even left open 
whether a roadblock with a valid purpose would be legitimate if it also had a 
secondary purpose of law enforcement.  Id. at 47 n.2. 
212. Id. at 47-48.  A strong dissent challenged this emphasis on purpose 
to separate lawful from unlawful checkpoints.  Id. at 48-56. 
213. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
214. This would seem consistent with Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 
428 (2004) (upholding a police roadblock conducted in order to locate 
witnesses of a fatal automobile crash).  See supra note 160. 
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the line would appear to illustrate the difference between a 
strategic approach—the permissible programmatic purpose of 
decreasing drug use—and the tactical approach—the 
impermissible case-specific purpose of identifying those 
transporting illegal drugs. 
It would not be surprising to see a five- or even six-justice 
majority, intent on approving the USA-PATRIOT Act‘s 
expansion of FISA authority, treat Edmond as of no relevance 
to FISA electronic surveillance or searches.  Still, the decision 
raises serious questions about the attempts to shoehorn 
criminal enforcement purposes into foreign intelligence 
searches.  First, there is the need to find the border between 
law enforcement and other purposes, even if Edmond does not 
define it clearly in that setting.  It is hard to characterize the 
collection of evidence for proof of past crimes as anything other 
than a law enforcement purpose, which would seem to be 
consistent with the strategic/tactical distinction identified 
above.  Similarly, if the government in the foreign intelligence 
sphere is to be free of the traditional strictures of the Fourth 
Amendment, as FISA provides, it must be because FISA 
investigations are truly premised on a purpose other than 
criminal law enforcement.215  That is, FISA is a federal 
statutory program for a non-law enforcement search, and it is 
governed by those principles that govern such searches.  So 
understood, the creation of the wall and the need to limit FISA 
actions to those in which foreign intelligence purposes 
dominate is unremarkable.  If anything, the primary purpose 
requirement of pre-USA-PATRIOT Act FISA pushes the 
envelope to some degree, as Edmond left open the question of 
the validity of a checkpoint in which a legitimate special needs 
purpose was accompanied by a secondary law enforcement 
purpose.  After the USA-PATRIOT Act amendment, FISA now 
reverses the relationship, purporting to legitimate FISA 
searches in which the foreign intelligence purpose is 
―significant,‖ but secondary to a law enforcement purpose. 
I argue below that the courts should reject this expansion 
of FISA.  In fact, both the Plain View and Pretense settings 
 
215. This would presumably be dictated by Keith because that Court 
seemed to hold that, while there would be room for Congress to provide 
different procedures for intelligence investigations, in the criminal realm 
Title III and traditional Fourth Amendment procedures necessarily apply. 
45
2010] “INTELLIGENCE” SEARCHES AND PURPOSE 665 
involve legitimate criminal investigative searches, and the 
Fourth Amendment questions concern only whether additional 
use may be made of the evidence obtained.  In the FISA 
situation, especially after the USA-PATRIOT Act amendments, 
the difference is significant.  Here the critical fact that permits 
electronic surveillance (or a physical search) under FISA is 
that the government‘s motive is in fact to obtain intelligence of 
foreign intrigue for intelligence purposes—learning what other 
nations or terrorist groups are planning to do.  Under Keith, 
the constitutional validity of even national security searches 
subject to the Fourth Amendment would necessarily depend on 
the purpose actually being foreign intelligence.  In a situation 
in which law enforcement is the dominant motive of electronic 
surveillance, the far more stringent requirements of Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Act should apply.  In other words, what 
makes FISA different in terms of Fourth Amendment 
requirements should also make it different with respect to 
using evidence obtained during FISA investigations.216 
 
IV.  The ―Reasonableness‖ of FISA Searches to  
Collect Criminal Evidence 
 
A. The Totality of the Circumstances 
 
The dominant theme of the last thirty years of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment (and much of 
the Fifth Amendment law as well) is built on the concept of the 
totality of circumstances.  Probable cause is not based on the 
existence of specific categories of information, as it was for 
many years.217  It is based on the totality of circumstances 
known to the officer or magistrate making the determination in 
the particular case.218  Consent to search, probably the most 
 
216. Other reasons for this different treatment of FISA-obtained 
evidence relate to aspects of the Fourth Amendment that were not really in 
play at the time of Keith and the initial version of FISA.  These include 
changes in territoriality—cutbacks on the reach of the Fourth Amendment 
and the growth of federal criminal offenses relating to acts in foreign nations.  
They also include the change in central missions for the Department of 
Justice and FBI. 
217. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
218. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
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widely used warrant exception, is also based on a totality of 
circumstances analysis.219  Perhaps most generally, a totality of 
circumstances analysis determines both whether a person has 
been stopped by the police, thereby bringing Fourth 
Amendment rights into play, and whether there is a reasonable 
suspicion of a potential crime to justify that stop, and thus be 
in compliance with constitutional requirements.220  As noted 
above, the FISCR has accepted the totality of circumstances 
methodology for determining the validity of FISA electronic 
surveillance.221 
For the most part, the totality of circumstances approach 
has been a vehicle for scouring the record to identify possible 
reasons that support police action, reasons that, by themselves, 
may not amount to much, but, when considered in context with 
other reasons—i.e., the totality—add up to a legitimate basis 
for a police search or other Fourth Amendment action.  Thus, 
the totality of circumstances framework can be characterized 
as ―police or prosecution-friendly.‖  In the area of dual-purpose 
foreign intelligence and criminal investigation actions under 
FISA, however, the totality of circumstances analysis reaches a 
different result.  Here the various circumstances add up to 
illustrate the unreasonableness of allowing the broad use of 
FISA searches and seizures in criminal investigations that 
overlap with foreign intelligence operations.  There are at least 
six bases for this argument.  In keeping with the totality 
theme, any of these bases individually would probably not be a 
convincing reason to deviate from the Whren, Plain View, and 
Special Needs Doctrines, which might support law enforcement 
use of these intelligence techniques.  But two or three, and 
 
219. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
220. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (finding 
that the justifiability of a Terry-type seizure or search, like a seizure or 
search based on probable cause, is supposed to be evaluated on ―the totality of 
the circumstances—the whole picture‖); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544 (1980) (plurality opinion) (finding that the stop amounted to a 
Fourth Amendment seizure) (accepted by majority in INS v. Delgado, 466 
U.S. 210 (1984)).  Other constitutional tests that depend on the totality of 
circumstances range from the very common evaluation of the voluntariness of 
confessions, see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), to the 
unusual assessment of the use of force to capture a fleeing suspect, see 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
221. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). 
47
2010] “INTELLIGENCE” SEARCHES AND PURPOSE 667 
certainly all six together, make for a different calculation.  In 
context—in totality—these factors support the notion that the 
Fourth Amendment, and probably rights contained in other 
constitutional provisions as well, depends on limiting those 
doctrines to their very different circumstances. 
 
B. Factors Detracting from the Reasonableness of FISA 
Searches for Law Enforcement Purposes 
 
1.  The Obvious Purposes and Public Openness of Most 
Special Needs Searches 
 
One of the reasons that the special needs category of 
searches works as a variant of traditional Fourth Amendment 
procedures is that it is usually apparent both that the 
government‘s objective is not law enforcement and that 
criminal evidence is only an accidental, if not always 
surprising, byproduct of the civil purpose.  Thus, agents 
conduct a roadblock for a public safety purpose, and during 
that roadblock discover evidence of a crime.  It is no stretch to 
conclude that the roadblock was conducted lawfully, and 
therefore that use of the evidence derived in a criminal case is 
equally lawful under the Plain View Doctrine.  There are cases 
where the purposes are not obvious or where there are multiple 
purposes—and these can cause problems.  Still, it is not 
difficult to conclude that drug testing of individuals in safety or 
sensitive positions is conducted to ensure that the persons in 
those positions are drug-free, and not to collect evidence for 
criminal prosecution.222  Similarly, roadblocks may be expected 
to result in identifying some intoxicated drivers who are then 
subject to criminal prosecution, but the roadblocks are 
conducted in order to minimize drunk driving through 
deterrence of the practice rather than through prosecution of 
criminals. 
This seems equally obvious in the classic security search: 
the airport security gate checkpoint that now includes 
 
222. This is clearly the case with respect to the Supreme Court‘s leading 
cases on drug tests.  See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives‘ Ass‘n, 489 
U.S. 602 (1989); Nat‘l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 
(1989). 
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mandatory identification checks, metal detectors, x-rays of 
carry-on belongings, and even virtual strip searches.  It is 
statistically likely that some persons will foolishly carry 
evidence of a crime through such checkpoints and will be 
discovered through the searches.223  But that is far from the 
purpose, or even a significant purpose, of searches at airport 
security gates.  Rather, air security searches are conducted in 
order to serve public safety by preventing air piracy or worse.  
They are open, notorious, and very public.224  Air travelers 
necessarily know what will happen to them at security 
checkpoints, and they know they can avoid discovery of 
embarrassing items or criminal evidence simply by leaving 
them at home.  Prominent and highly visible signs explain the 
nature and extent of air security searches and urge persons 
unwilling to undergo such searches to leave the terminal and 
travel by other means.  In other words, the governmental object 
of ensuring air safety is served by preventing dangerous 
passengers from trying anything foolish.  When this approach 
works, there is no evidence to use at trial.  In all likelihood, the 
government will never learn the identity of the potential air 
pirates.225 
FISA searches for foreign intelligence activities are 
necessarily different.  Part of the reason is that the government 
in fact wants to find the very things that will constitute 
 
223. There are numerous cases involving drug seizures and quite a few 
involving weapons.  See, e.g., United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 
1974) (handgun and knife activated metal detector); United States v. Legato, 
480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973) (heroin discovered in search of package for 
explosives); People v. Dooley, 134 Cal. Rptr. 573 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976) 
(narcotics discovered in checked luggage after anonymous call that bomb was 
on plane was received); Shapiro v. State, 390 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1980) (drugs 
found during pre-boarding security search); State v. David, 204 S.E.2d 773 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (firearm set off metal detector); People v. Brown, 493 
N.Y.S.2d 810 (App. Div. 1985) (gun seen in x-ray of briefcase).  But cf. United 
States v. $ 124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1989) (currency 
found in illegal search at destination, security justification no longer valid). 
224. Some early decisions relied on consent as a theory to uphold 
searches.  See supra note 171. 
225. The same would seem applicable to drug testing.  One of the major 
points of a drug-testing program is that people subject to the program will 
avoid using drugs.  See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607-09; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 
666 (―The purposes of the program are to deter drug use among those eligible 
for promotion to sensitive positions with the [Customs] Service and to 
prevent the promotion of drug users to those programs.‖). 
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evidence of criminal activity.  The objective of FISA searches is 
to locate proof of foreign espionage or terrorism, which means 
that the objective is to discover what is usually also evidence of 
a crime.  It asks too much of agents to distinguish between the 
―objects‖ to that degree, at least in the absence of clearly 
defined responsibilities and a wall or something like it.  It 
would be as if Transportation Security Agents were told to look 
primarily for drugs or counterfeit money, but then expected to 
justify their searches as based on protecting airplanes and 
passengers. 
More significantly, it is the measure of success that is most 
revealing of the difference in nature between special needs and 
FISA searches for criminal evidence.  Air security searches are 
effective largely because by announcing their existence, they 
prevent most hijackings.  The overriding purpose of air safety 
is served, but it is essentially at the disservice of law 
enforcement.  On the other hand, if passengers and baggage 
were secretly screened, it is likely that far more evidence of 
crime would be discovered.226  But the ―special need‖ of air 
safety, and the reasonableness of airport security searches 
under the Fourth Amendment, depends on openness.  The fact 
that national security searches cannot realistically be 
conducted in the open reveals that the special needs model does 
not fit very well to justify foreign intelligence searches, even 
where that is the only purpose. 
 
2.  The Extraordinarily Secretive Nature of FISA Searches 
 
In contrast, FISA searches are not just conducted without 
fanfare in a public arena; they are far more secret than is 
otherwise tolerated under the Fourth Amendment.  Unlike 
physical law enforcement searches, special needs intrusions, or 
even Title III electronic surveillance, notice is almost always 
non-existent or interminably delayed.  FISA requires notice to 
a subject of electronic surveillance only when the government 
intends to use evidence from that surveillance in a criminal 
 
226. Perhaps air security would be served as well as at present.  The 
answer would probably turn on whether the screening was sufficiently 
effective to prevent what would in all likelihood be a greater number of air 
piracy attempts. 
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prosecution.227  This may occur years after the electronic 
surveillance was conducted, or it may never occur.  Notice of 
FISA physical searches228 is provided only when the residence 
of a U.S. person is searched, and then, only after the Attorney 
General ―determines there is no national security interest in 
continuing to maintain the secrecy of the search.‖229  In 
contrast, Title III requires that notice of electronic surveillance 
be provided within a reasonable time after the end of the 
surveillance, with a statutory default rule of ninety days after 
the surveillance ends.230  The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provide that at the conclusion of a physical search, 
government officers are required to give to a person on the 
premises (or leave at empty premises) a copy of the search 
warrant and a receipt for all items taken.231  The delays and 
denials of notice under FISA are understandable, even 
necessary, in many legitimate foreign intelligence 
investigations.  But they seriously undercut any notion that 
such action is reasonable in what is primarily, or even 
significantly, a criminal investigation. 
The nature of surreptitious physical searches underlines 
this point.  Such searches were virtually unknown until they 
were used in connection with the installation of oral 
interception devices—radio transmitters—for electronic 
surveillance of face-to-face meetings.  When approved in that 
setting, rigid restrictions were imposed to ensure that the 
secret entry onto private property was not used as an 
opportunity to search for evidence or even domestic intelligence 
information.232  The law remained in that state until the 1995 
amendment of FISA to allow surreptitious physical searches.  
 
227. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2006) provides in pertinent part: ―Whenever 
the Government intends to enter into evidence . . . against an aggrieved 
person, any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of 
that aggrieved person pursuant to the authority of this subchapter, the 
Government shall, prior to the trial . . . notify the aggrieved person and the 
court or other authority . . . .‖  The text makes clear that the evidence could 
be used in a variety of settings, including state cases.  See id. § 1806(d). 
228. See supra Part I(B)(3). 
229. 50 U.S.C. § 1825(b). 
230. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2006). 
231. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1). 
232. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (upholding 
surreptitious entry order issued in connection with a Title III oral 
interception order). 
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Under FISA, searches of private homes may be conducted 
repeatedly for weeks or months without any judicial finding of 
probable cause, something that is unimaginable under 
traditional Fourth Amendment law.233 
Such secrecy alone would probably not be sufficient to 
render the loose strictures on foreign intelligence electronic 
surveillance and physical searches unconstitutional, but it is a 
factor that weighs heavily in that direction.  Without timely 
notice, there is a much greater intrusion on privacy; with 
repeated secret entries, there is a much greater intrusion on 
privacy.  Considering these factors, along with others such as 
the severe restrictions on judicial review, this greater intrusion 
requires a concomitantly greater justification.  It cannot be 
satisfied by the standards of FISA or other laws that require 
only a lesser justification. 
 
3.  The Problem of Minimal Judicial Review 
 
Many, if not all, of these problems could be remedied by 
meaningful judicial review.  Such review is lacking in FISA. 
Judicial review purportedly occurs in two settings.  First, it 
 
233. Section 213 of the USA-PATRIOT Act amended Section 3103a of 
Title 18 of the U.S. Code to allow for ―delayed notice,‖ formal statutory 
authority for surreptitious physical searches, in all criminal cases—not just 
those involving foreign intelligence.  United and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 213, 115 Stat. 272, 
285-286 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3103a).  At least prior to that 
statute, such ―sneak and peak‖ searches were far more limited and subject to 
more judicial oversight than FISA surreptitious entry searches.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 
We take this position because surreptitious searches and 
seizures of intangibles strike at the very heart of the 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.  The mere 
thought of strangers walking through and visually 
examining the center of our privacy interest, our home, 
arouses our passion for freedom as does nothing else.  That 
passion, the true source of the Fourth Amendment demands 
that surreptitious entries be closely circumscribed.  The 
warrants in this case failed to do so. 
 
Id.  See also United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336-38 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(imposing a good cause requirement for delaying notice of electronic 
surveillance). 
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occurs in the initial authorization of the FISA order.  Second, it 
occurs in litigation in which FISA searches are challenged, 
most commonly through motions to suppress FISA-based 
evidence.  Yet the judicial role in authorization is limited in 
several respects.  First, as noted above, FISA permits electronic 
surveillance in the United States in several settings without 
any judicial role at all.234  Section 102 of FISA allows 
warrantless electronic surveillance of non-U.S. persons for as 
long as one year.235  Another provision provides for electronic 
surveillance without prior judicial authorization in an 
emergency situation.236  The Bush Administration reportedly 
found this provision too burdensome and therefore sought 
additional powers to conduct warrantless electronic 
surveillance and apparently conducted such electronic 
surveillance outside of FISA on its own reading of 
constitutional law.237  FISA similarly allows physical searches 
for up to one year on authorization of the Attorney General 
under similar standards.238 
Judicial review of FISA applications is also highly limited.  
Courts simply do not make the sort of decisions they make in 
criminal cases.  Rather, they serve largely as receivers of 
certifications from the government, such as the certification 
that a significant purpose of the action is foreign intelligence.239  
 
234. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
235. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 
102(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1783, 1786 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2006)). 
236. Id. § 105(e), 92 Stat. at 1791-1792 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e) 
(2006)).  The section provides in pertinent part that: ―[W]hen the Attorney 
General reasonably determines that . . . an emergency situation exists . . . he 
may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance . . . .‖  Id.  
The government must notify a judge and seek judicial approval after the fact.  
See id. 
237. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1 (first report of electronic 
surveillance outside of FISA).  See also Anushka Asthana & Karen DeYoung, 
Bush Calls For Greater Wiretap Authority, WASH. POST., Sept. 8, 2006, at A1; 
Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau, Cheney Pushed U.S. to Widen Eavesdropping, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, at A1. 
238. The general authority to engage in warrantless searches is limited 
to situations in which it is unlikely that U.S. citizens will be subject to the 
search.  50 U.S.C. § 1822(a) (2006).  The emergency search authority is 
almost the same as the emergency electronic surveillance provision.  Id. § 
1824(e). 
239. See id. § 1804(a) (listing the certifications from the Department of 
Justice); id. § 1805(a) (providing that the court must find that the application 
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The only probable cause requirements are that the target is a 
foreign power (or an agent of a foreign power) and that the 
facilities are used by such person or agent.240  The FISC is not 
required to find probable cause that the electronic surveillance 
or search will result in acquisition of foreign intelligence 
information.241  This, of course, is a far lower standard than the 
applicable test in criminal investigations.242  The judicial 
approval process is little more than judicial recordkeeping of an 
executive branch fishing expedition.  That may be fine for a 
true foreign intelligence investigation, but it is not sufficient 
judicial involvement where the primary purpose of the 
government‘s action is to secure evidence for a criminal 
prosecution. 
These limitations on the judicial role in the authorization 
process might be less of a problem if a judge could fully 
consider the relevant facts behind an application (or a 
warrantless search) in the context of later litigation.  In other 
words, if a court had to retroactively decide if in fact there was 
probable cause to support a search or seizure, the search might 
be reasonable.  FISA provides, however, that the role of the 
trial judge is more limited.  The judge‘s only role is essentially 
to see that the paperwork underlying the search was in 
order.243 
The key factor making judicial review at this stage fairly 
shallow is Section 1806(f) of Title 50 of the U.S. Code, which 
prevents disclosure of FISA documents and requires ex parte 
review in most cases.244  The history of FISA suppression 
 
contains all statements and certifications required by § 1804). 
240. Id. § 1805(a)(2). 
241. Numerous reported cases explain the relative roles of the 
Department of Justice and the FISC in authorizing electronic surveillance.  
See, e.g., United States v. Amawi, 531 F. Supp. 2d 832, 834-37 (N.D. Ohio 
2008); United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986 (D. Minn. 2008); 
United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-04 (D. Conn. 2008). 
242. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-39 (1983) (fair 
probability that evidence will be discovered).  See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE 
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3 (5th ed. 2009). 
243. There is no evaluation of the probable cause of a crime or other 
textual requirements of the Fourth Amendment, such as reasonable 
descriptions of the places and items in question.  With respect to the key 
question of probable cause, the only judicial role is in the authorization 
process, where the judge issuing the order must conclude, in the case of a 
U.S. person, that the certifications are not clearly erroneous.  § 1805(a). 
244. Section 1806(f) is a long and complex provision that seems to 
54https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/20
674 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
hearings reveals that the Department of Justice always files an 
affidavit stating that national security requires FISA 
documents remain under seal, that courts always honor these 
requests, and that the resulting judicial evaluations are 
ritualistic.  For example, in United States v. Mubayyid, the 
court stated: 
 
It is of course true that the legality of the 
surveillance and search would be better tested 
through the adversarial process; an ex parte 
review is not a perfect substitute for that process.  
The question under the statute, however, is not 
how to optimize the legal review of the 
surveillance and search, but whether disclosure 
is ―necessary‖ in order to make that 
determination.245 
 
The court then addressed the validity of foreign intelligence 
electronic surveillance in what seems to be a complex federal 
income tax case, without revealing who, when, where, how 
often, how long, why, or on what basis the government acted, 
all in approximately the space of one Federal Supplement page 
that contained little but ipse dixit conclusions.246  What little 
we know of government errors in the FISA process comes from 
 
provide for in camera ex parte review by the court when the government files 
an affidavit explaining that disclosure, even to the attorneys, would harm 
national security.  Id. § 1806(f).  In fact, such affidavits appear to have been 
filed in all cases, and ex parte review has always resulted in judicial approval.  
In other areas of law, national security concerns have been alleviated through 
careful practices, such as those provided in the Classified Information 
Procedures Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3, §§1-16 (2006)).  See, e.g., United States v. Aref, 
533 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1582. 
245. United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 (D. Mass. 
2007). 
246. Id. at 131-32.  Numerous courts have upheld electronic surveillance 
after limited ex parte hearings, or else refused to allow disclosure to the 
defense.  See, e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 
552 F.3d 157, 165-67 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 2010 WL 58776 (U.S. Jan. 
11, 2010); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299 (D. Conn. 2008); 
United States v. Amawi, 531 F. Supp. 2d 832 (N.D. Ohio 2008); United States 
v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Minn. 2008); United States v. Rosen, 
447 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Va. 2006).  But cf. El-Masri v. United States, 479 
F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (dismissal of civil action 
under Bivens dismissed due to state secrets privilege). 
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All Matters, where the FISC noted that there had been 
―misstatements and omissions of material facts‖ in seventy-five 
FISA applications, some of which apparently involved 
intentional misstatements.247  It seems likely that even more 
would be discovered in the adversary system generally required 
for criminal litigation.  As it happens, however, the government 
is allowed to conduct foreign intelligence electronic surveillance 
under the honor system.  It is no wonder that the government 
prefers to follow FISA rather than Title III in investigations 
that are primarily criminal in nature. 
This minimal judicial role greatly detracts from the 
reasonableness of the statutory scheme for foreign intelligence 
searches.  It is possible, though far from certain, that such 
formalistic judicial review is constitutional where the primary 
purpose of the government‘s action is to seek foreign 
intelligence.  That, at least, was Congress‘s intent in enacting 
FISA.  Where, however, the government leaves the legitimate 
special needs category of foreign intelligence to conduct a 
search primarily for law enforcement purposes, it is important 
that the Fourth Amendment not be applied through the very 
generous lens of foreign intelligence. 
 
4.  The Expansion of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction of 
International and Terrorism Crimes 
 
The Federal Government has increasingly used criminal 
prosecutions as a vehicle for fighting terrorism.  At the time of 
FISA‘s enactment, the prevailing notion of the crimes 
committed by foreign powers was espionage.  It is no accident 
that most of the criminal cases resulting from this era were 
essentially espionage cases in which successful foreign 
intelligence electronic surveillance provided evidence that one 
or more persons were involved in spying on this country.248  
Over roughly the last thirty years, however, Congress has 
 
247. In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620-21 (FISA Ct. 2002).  See supra notes 134-36 
and accompanying text.  Although the court‘s order was overturned on 
appeal, nothing in the FISCR‘s decision questioned the accuracy of the FISC‘s 
findings on this point. 
248. See, e.g., Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980) (Vietnamese spies); 
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974) (Soviet spies). 
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enacted a number of statutes that expanded criminal liability 
for engaging in terrorist activities, expanded criminal law 
jurisdiction to include extraterritorial actions, and, of course, 
authorized greater use of investigative techniques to prevent 
and punish terrorism.249  A short history of major legislation of 
the post-FISA period includes enactment of the offense of 
Hostage Taking as part of an omnibus crime bill,250 the 
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986,251 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,252 
and, of course, the USA-PATRIOT Act.253  The 1986 law 
expanded federal power abroad, largely to protect diplomatic 
personnel and facilities, but it also expanded federal criminal 
jurisdiction by making it a United States crime to engage in 
terrorist actions abroad that harm U.S. nationals.  That law 
included a provision that made it unlawful to ―kill[ ] a national 
of the United States, while such national is outside the United 
States.‖254  This has the effect of allowing federal criminal 
prosecutions for murder or manslaughter that occurs abroad, 
where terrorists kill U.S. citizens.  Abu-Jihaad was charged 
with violating this law.255  The 1996 law contained a number of 
provisions directed at terrorist activities.  It significantly added 
to substantive federal criminal law by including the crime of 
 
249. Some actions occurred earlier.  Air piracy became a crime with the 
Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 410, amended by 
Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1241 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 
46502 (2006)).  This is consistent with the rash of airplane hijackings of the 
period. 
250. Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage 
Taking, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2002, 98 Stat. 1837, 2186 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006)). 
251. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.). 
252. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
253. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (codified as amended at 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823). 
254. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, § 
1202, 100 Stat. at 896 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a) (2006)). 
255. Indictment, supra note 1, at ¶ 29.  Mayfield was apparently 
arrested as a material witness to terrorism offenses in Spain.  See Mayfield v. 
United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1026-29 (D. Or. 2007), vacated, 588 F.3d 
1252 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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―providing material support for terrorist organizations.‖256  
Professor Norman Abrams points out that ―most of the 
prosecutions initiated since September 11, 2001 have involved 
offenses and related provisions enacted in the 1996 Act.‖257 
The emphasis of the USA-PATRIOT Act, on the other 
hand, was in expanding investigative powers and techniques.  
In addition to allowing the use of FISA for investigations in 
which foreign intelligence is a significant, but not primary, 
purpose, the law included provisions that eased restrictions on 
the use of pen registers and access to internet 
communications,258 loosened grand jury secrecy in the foreign 
intelligence area,259 and expanded the scope of subpoenas for 
records and tangible evidence.260  Other laws, including a series 
of laws intended to permit greater executive use of electronic 
 
256. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 323, 110 
Stat. at 1255, amending Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120005(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 
2022 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006)).  The provision 
provides, in pertinent part, that ―[w]hoever provides material support or 
resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of 
material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used 
in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [numerous sabotage and 
terrorism-related offenses].‖  § 2339A(a).  See also id. § 2339B (2006) 
(Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations). 
257. NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 10 
(3d ed. 2008).  This book contains an extended and informative discussion of 
federal legislative efforts during this period.  See id. at 6-48.  Well-known 
prosecutions for these offenses include United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 
316 (4th Cir. 2004) (money laundering and material support conviction 
related to Hizballah); United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (prosecution of New York criminal defense attorney Lynne Stewart for 
passing messages to and from convicted terrorist leader); Indictment, United 
States v. Lindh, No. CR 02-37-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 2002), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/lindh/uswlindh020502cmp.html. 
258. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, § 
214, 115 Stat. at 286 (codified as amended at §§ 1842-1843 (2006)) (Pen 
Registers and Trap and Trace Authority Under FISA); id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 
287-88 (codified as amended at § 1861 (2006)) (Access to Certain Business 
Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism Investigations). 
259. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D) (Authority to Share Criminal 
Investigative Information). 
260. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act of 2001, § 
210, 115 Stat. at 283 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006)) (Scope 
of Subpoenas for Electronic Communications); id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287-88 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006)). 
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surveillance, have been passed since 2001.261  These and other 
statutes have provided various legal tools, such as executive 
orders, to designate organizations as terrorist organizations 
and to freeze assets of such groups.262 
Before this great expansion of both federal criminal 
jurisdiction and civil and criminal vehicles for fighting 
terrorism, it was reasonable to think of foreign intelligence as 
primarily directed to international politics, diplomacy, and war, 
with criminal prosecution an ancillary part of the government‘s 
efforts against foreign espionage and terrorism.  Now criminal 
prosecution is clearly a major part of a very big toolbox.  The 
cost of making criminal prosecution such a central part of the 
government‘s efforts in this area is that, where prosecution 
rather than intelligence-gathering is the primary purpose of 
electronic surveillance or physical searches, it may well be that 
the government has to follow the procedures laid down by the 
Constitution for the investigation and prosecution of criminal 
cases. 
 
5.  FISA Searches are Extremely Intrusive, Especially 
Compared to most Special Needs Searches 
 
No one can doubt that the electronic surveillance and 
physical searches authorized by FISA are extremely intrusive 
on personal privacy.  Electronic surveillance has been 
recognized as among the most invasive of government 
investigative techniques since Berger v. New York,263 where the 
Court stated: ―Few threats to liberty exist which are greater 
than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices.‖264  The 
Court was equally clear in Keith: 
 
261. See, e.g., USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.); Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 
Stat. 552 (to be codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
262. See, e.g., Chai v. Dep‘t of State, 466 F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(reviewing Secretary of State‘s order designating organization as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization); Global Relief Found. v. O‘Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (reviewing Secretary of Treasury‘s order freezing assets). 
263. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
264. Id. at 63. 
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There is, understandably, a deep-seated 
uneasiness and apprehension that this 
[electronic surveillance] capability will be used to 
intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding 
citizens.  We look to the Bill of Rights to 
safeguard this privacy.  Though physical entry of 
the home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed, its 
broader spirit now shields private speech from 
unreasonable surveillance.265 
 
Interceptions of telephone conversations or face-to-face 
meetings, and physical invasions of a person‘s home, even with 
a warrant, are frightening and degrading and a strong reason 
for the prominence of the Fourth Amendment in constitutional 
text and history. 
Two additional aspects of FISA searches illustrate the fact 
that their impact is unmatched among generally lawful 
intelligence-gathering activities.  First, the lack of a criminal 
probable cause requirement opens the door to government 
action based on general notions of subversion, disloyalty, or 
vocal policy disagreement.  It is for this reason that FISA 
explicitly provides that ―no United States person may be 
considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely 
upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States.‖266  While this should 
help protect many within the class of U.S. persons, the need to 
include it proves the potential threat to liberties.  Here again 
the Keith Court was direct: 
 
Official surveillance, whether its purpose be 
criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence 
gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally 
protected privacy of speech.  Security 
surveillances are especially sensitive because of 
 
265. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 312-13 (1972). 
266. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 
105, 92 Stat. 1783, 1790 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2006)).  
See Kreimer, supra note 28 (concerning the extent to which political views 
have affected surveillance targeting in the past). 
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the inherent vagueness of the domestic security 
concept, the necessarily broad and continuing 
nature of intelligence gathering, and the 
temptation to utilize such surveillances to 
oversee political dissent.267 
 
Second, FISA searches are exceptionally lengthy.  Electronic 
surveillance can be authorized for a year, and extensions are 
possible;268 the same authorization periods apply even to 
physical searches.269  In contrast, electronic surveillance orders 
in criminal investigations can only be valid for up to thirty 
days.270  Under typical search law, a physical search occurs 
once, within fourteen days of the issuance of the search 
warrant.271 
The question of surreptitious searches raises other 
questions that arise only in rare and extreme criminal cases.  A 
search authorization for ninety days, without notice at that 
time to the owner or occupant, and without the purpose of 
seizing tangible evidence, is obviously an authorization for one 
or more secret searches.  Secret searches are by definition more 
intrusive on personal freedom and security than even a full-
scale item-by-item police search.  The fear of being subject to 
such continued violations, and the possibility of learning about 
them only months or years after the fact, are unquestionably 
severe invasions of Fourth Amendment interests.272  The facts 
of Mayfield illustrate some aspects of the intrusion on both his 
rights and those of his family: 
 
The family‘s most intimate conversations were 
recorded.  They were followed.  When the FBI 
 
267. Keith, 407 U.S. at 320. 
268. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, § 102(a)(1), 92 
Stat. at 1786 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2006)) (concerning 
warrantless orders).  See also id. § 105(d)(2), 92 Stat. at 1790 (current version 
at § 1805(d)(2)) (concerning court orders). 
269. See 50 U.S.C. § 1822(a)(1) (2006).  See also § 1824(d)(2). 
270. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006). 
271. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(i). 
272. See generally Robert Duncan, Surreptitious Search Warrants and 
the USA Patriot Act: “Thinking Outside the Box But Within the Constitution,” 
or a Violation of Fourth Amendment Protections?, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1 
(2004). 
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thought the Mayfields were not at home or at 
work, FBI agents on multiple occasions 
surreptitiously entered their house and law 
office, looking at and copying their personal and 
private documents, legal files and computer hard 
drives.  The government admits that over 300 
photographs were taken inside the Mayfield 
home, and additional photographs inside Mr. 
Mayfield‘s law office.273 
 
The intrusive effect of FISA electronic surveillance and 
searches is in stark contrast to the sort of intrusion permitted 
in most special needs cases.  As Professor Dressler notes, police 
officers rarely conduct special needs searches; instead it is 
usually civilian, non-law-enforcement employees, who lack the 
intimidating appearance of armed officers.274  Courts upholding 
special needs searches often stress that the search was not 
excessively intrusive,275 or involved only a minimal privacy 
interest.276  The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized 
that a search was reasonable in part because it was short in 
duration.277  Special needs searches are often very limited, 
looking only for specific items, thus the searches are closely 
tailored to fit that special need.  The attempt to expand the 
special need of foreign intelligence to encompass searches 
primarily directed to law enforcement completely undercuts the 
principle, and therefore undercuts this rationale for exemption 
from standard Fourth Amendment requirements. 
 
 
273. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff‘s Motion For Summary 
Judgment, Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007) (No. 
CV-04-1427-AA), 2007 WL 834254, at *1.  Although this was the plaintiff‘s 
memorandum, these matters were in the stipulation of facts between 
Mayfield and the government. 
274. JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 328 (4th ed. 2006). 
275. See, e.g., O‘Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987). 
276. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives‘ Ass‘n, 489 U.S. 602, 624-
26 (1989). 
277. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004); Mich. Dep‘t of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976). 
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6.  The Hardship to the Government is Largely Illusory 
 
The implication, by those who support the USA-PATRIOT 
Act‘s expansion of FISA, is that modification was necessary in 
order to allow intelligence officers to ―connect the dots.‖278  This 
claim does not withstand analysis.  No one has suggested, let 
alone proved, that appropriate foreign intelligence actions were 
prevented by the primary purpose requirement or the wall that 
the Department of Justice developed to show that its FISA 
investigations were in fact motivated by foreign intelligence 
objectives.  Statistics indicate that FISA orders have increased 
somewhat over the last decade,279 but there is no reason to 
believe that this results from use of FISA for what are 
primarily criminal investigations.  Logic suggests that the 
increased use of FISA has resulted largely from the increased 
human and material resources devoted to the war on terrorism 
after the September 11 attacks.  Unless and until anyone can 
prove that worthwhile foreign intelligence investigations had to 
be derailed due to the primary purpose requirement, it is hard 
to give credence to claims that the requirement imposes a 
serious burden on legitimate intelligence investigations.280  In 
fact, if the intelligence officials were making good choices about 
targets, and government attorneys were reasonably 
interpreting FISA and the Fourth Amendment, the only FISA 
searches that should have been prevented by the primary 
 
278. See, e.g., ASHCROFT, supra note 24, at 144-56 (criticisms of the wall). 
279. Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 152. 
280. The only specific example of such an occurrence in the large body of 
writing on intelligence matters over the last several decades does not provide 
much support.  Victoria Toensing, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in 
the President Reagan Justice Department, has written that she terminated a 
FISA wiretap during an air hijacking on advice from career attorneys.  The 
attorneys were apparently concerned that remaining on a wiretap of 
associates of the hijackers prevented the tap from being primarily for foreign 
intelligence purposes.  See Kris, supra note 112, at 501.  Putting aside the 
fact that this decision took place long before the sorts of rigid procedures 
derided as ―the wall,‖ it reveals only bad lawyering by political and career 
Justice Department attorneys.  An otherwise legitimate foreign intelligence 
wiretap that provides information helpful in ending a terrorist event is self-
evidently a foreign intelligence wiretap.  The intention and use are both to 
learn about and resolve a terrorist event—plainly an intelligence purpose.  
The use of information in the resulting criminal prosecutions is the sort of 
secondary use of information anticipated by FISA and the courts that have 
considered criminal cases using FISA evidence. 
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purpose requirement would be those primarily directed at 
collecting evidence against U.S. persons for criminal 
prosecution.  Unless we change the Fourth Amendment, our 
system treats that as a tolerable burden.281 
In the end, that is what the Special Needs Doctrine seems 
to be about.  The policies underlying programmatic searches, 
from drug tests to D.U.I. roadblocks to foreign intelligence 
electronic surveillance, are debatable and require legislative 
rather than judicial oversight.  If those policies are sufficiently 
compelling, and the burdens on individuals comparatively 
light, it makes sense for courts not to bring into play the full 
panoply of Fourth Amendment requirements.  But the cost to 
the public of the government obtaining search and seizure 
powers without meeting those requirements is that it must 
avoid conducting its criminal investigations using those 
enhanced foreign intelligence powers. 
If the price of robust powers to protect the nation is that 
the government bend over backwards to avoid using criminal 
law remedies, it is a price worth paying.  There are many 
examples of governments having to forego criminal 
prosecutions because of choices made at the investigative stage.  
Some involve typical criminal justice system actions, such as 
grants of immunity.  Others, more applicable to the current 
international scene, result from government actions that 
include overly aggressive tactics, such as harsh interrogations, 
in which the resulting evidence may be inadmissible in court.  
Sometimes criminal cases are quashed because of other legal or 
political realities, such as where Diplomatic or Consular 
Immunity prevents prosecution, or spies are traded back to 
their own nations.  Insisting on the legality of electronic 
surveillance without probable cause, and in some cases without 
 
281. In the end, this is not really much about the exclusionary rule.  
Whether courts decide to permit or exclude evidence obtained for criminal 
cases is largely beside the point.  As in most other special needs settings, the 
real issue is the extent to which the government may engage in searches or 
seizures, and the underlying question is the permissibility of the program, 
rather than the treatment of the resulting evidence.  If the government 
follows the primary purpose test, as it presumably did from 1978 to 2001, 
however, there would not even be a question about the admissibility of the 
resulting evidence because doctrines such as the Plain View doctrine, see 
discussion supra notes 189-93, and cases such as Illinois v. Lidster, 504 U.S. 
419 (2004), see supra note 214, plainly allow the use in criminal prosecutions 
of evidence obtained in special needs cases. 
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warrants, in order to achieve criminal law enforcement 
purposes runs the real risk that the techniques will be marked 
off-limits, even for intelligence purposes, because it can no 
longer be stated with confidence that the searches are 
reasonable, special needs searches. 
The wall, as developed over several presidential 
administrations and as revised by the FISC in 2002, really 
served to enhance government power.  Its existence allowed the 
intelligence agencies to operate, confident that they could prove 
that their investigations were motivated by the need for foreign 
intelligence.  At the same time it allowed the Department of 
Justice to use the results of FISA searches in criminal 
prosecutions.  In a sense, the wall allowed the government to 
prove that its foreign intelligence searches were in fact special 
needs searches.  It cannot do so today. 
 
V.  Conclusion: The New Paradigm and the Limits of Precedent 
 
One year into the Obama Administration, there is no 
indication that the Department of Justice has ended John 
Ashcroft‘s New Paradigm.  Apparently, we can expect the 
Department to continue to emphasize prevention of terrorism 
over the prosecution of crime.  Since the government is still 
likely to move aggressively against international terrorists in 
federal criminal prosecutions, the dual purpose foreign 
intelligence/law enforcement search is likely to be with us for 
some time. 
As long as intelligence and prevention are the first objects 
of the Department, there must be some workable set of rules to 
make sure that the New Paradigm does not obliterate the 
probable cause and warrant requirements—the default settings 
of the Fourth Amendment.  It is not acceptable to adopt a pure 
―reasonableness‖ requirement and then to rubber stamp as 
reasonable each and every intrusion that seems to serve short-
term needs.  The lightweight version of the Fourth Amendment 
contemplated by the Special Needs and other various doctrines, 
which allow very intrusive searches without the traditional 
protections of the Fourth Amendment, are controversial 
enough in their own right and are plainly inadequate when 
purposely used to enforce criminal law.  The ―special needs‖ 
Fourth Amendment exists only because it is outside the 
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criminal law system.  Its application in the criminal law system 
is thus a serious error of constitutional criminal procedure and 
a potential disruption of the complex set of doctrines that have 
grown up to permit government searches in appropriate non-
criminal cases.  The wild card of the ―significant purpose‖ rule 
is as likely to result in a narrowing of foreign intelligence 
powers or, more generally, in special needs authority, as it is to 
result in approving enhanced authority to search in quasi-
criminal matters. 
Despite the bromides directed at the wall‘s arguable effect 
of shutting down some intelligence sources, it has largely 
served to keep the criminal justice system out of the way of the 
intelligence gathering system, and vice versa.  To take the 
anecdotal example of the unwillingness of the FBI to share 
data concerning flight training by suspected terrorists before 
the September 11 attacks, is it really likely that such obviously 
pertinent intelligence information was somehow kept from 
intelligence officers by the wall?  The information was 
intelligence, not criminal evidence.  It only became criminal 
evidence after the intelligence system failed and there was a 
crime to investigate.  If the information had been shared there 
might never have been September 11 attacks, and if they had 
still occurred, the use of intelligence information in any 
resulting criminal prosecution would be patently lawful.  Any 
dot-connecting flaws were due to the lack of coordination 
within the intelligence community.282  No problems resulted 
from applying the Fourth Amendment‘s requirements to those 
investigations in which law enforcement, rather than foreign 
 
282. Stated differently, the wall should not be blamed for the failure of 
government officials to implement it effectively.  The recent history of the 
period reveals that inadequate resources were provided to the agencies, the 
data management was mid-20th century, and good-old bureaucratic turf 
protection was in full force.  In the wake of the September 11 attacks, 
Attorney General Ashcroft identified a lack of political will and inadequate 
technology as major causes.  ASHCROFT, supra note 24, at 244.  The failure to 
share information competently within intelligence agencies remains a critical 
problem, as revealed by the events leading up to the attempted Christmas 
2009 ―underwear‖ bombing.  See Peter Baker & Carl Hulse, Obama Hears of 
Signs that Should have Grounded Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at A1; 
Karen DeYoung, Bombing Reports Start Trickling In to Obama, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 30, 2009, at A3; Doyle McManus, Op-Ed., Another Failure to 
Communicate, 9/11 was Supposed to be a Wake-Up Call For U.S. Intelligence 
Agencies.  Nope., L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at 26. 
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intelligence, was the dominant purpose.283 
In the end, the problem of using investigative techniques 
against potential terrorists to obtain foreign intelligence and to 
collect evidence of crimes illustrates one of those law school 
conundrums—the limits of building logically on precedent.  
Here, it is possible to take several minor steps and see them 
lead fairly clearly in the direction of allowing the use of broad 
and largely unregulated tactics against potential sources of 
foreign intelligence in order to obtain evidence that would be 
useful and probably admissible in criminal prosecutions.  This 
is what the FISCR did when it concluded in 2002 that the 
Special Needs Doctrine allowed such searches.  The logical 
components, however, lead to an illogical conclusion.  In fact, 
the minor steps obscure that the fundamental requirement is 
reasonableness, and what is reasonable can depend on a 
number of factors, not just to the extent it furthers the goal of 
foreign intelligence. 
The reasonableness ―totality of the circumstances‖ test has 
long been a central part of Fourth Amendment law, and by 
definition, serves to prevent abstract theories from building up 
a superstructure that ignores context, impact, and the practical 
aspects of both intelligence and criminal investigations.  In a 
sense, this is the message of City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.284  
If the purpose of the investigation is something other than law 
enforcement, then application of traditional law enforcement 
aspects of the Fourth Amendment seems beside the point.  
Instead, courts seek a common sense accommodation of the 
competing interests and apply it to the intrusion.  But where 
there is a significant law enforcement purpose, traditional 
rules must apply.  Otherwise, there would be no limits to 
mandatory drug tests, roadblocks, and presumably house-to-
house and car-to-car searches—all for any of a number of 
combined law enforcement and ―special needs‖ purposes.  The 
attempt in the USA-PATRIOT Act to end-run these principles 
by allowing extremely aggressive searches where a 
 
283. And even if they were, we would all be happier now if the officials 
in question had recognized that the national security interest was in fact 
dominant, disclosed the information as required by public safety, and let the 
chips fall where they may. 
284. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).  See supra 
notes 200-14 and accompanying text. 
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―significant‖ purpose is foreign intelligence simply turns 
Edmond on its head.  It purports to allow a secondary or 
tertiary intelligence purpose to override the dominant law 
enforcement purpose in many cases.  On top of that, it allows 
the most intrusive sorts of searches, and those that are most 
likely to turn up evidence of crimes.  We do not know how 
many FISA searches or other intelligence investigations are 
flawed in this fashion.  It may be very few, which would 
support the argument that returning to the wall and the 
primary purpose requirement would cause little disruption to 
national security.  It may be more than a few, which would 
support the argument that greater care should be taken to 
ensure that the government is not permitted to get around the 
Fourth Amendment in criminal cases by invoking the deus ex 
machina of foreign intelligence.  The wall, with its insistence 
that foreign intelligence searches be justified by foreign 
intelligence justifications, protects us and still allows 
appropriate government searches to continue. 
But I hold no confidence in the power or the will of most 
courts to insist that the government turn square corners in this 
respect.  The political pressure to do nothing that appears to 
make intelligence-gathering or criminal prosecution more 
difficult is seemingly too much to resist, apparently even for 
judges with lifetime tenure, and even where the added burden 
on intelligence investigations is almost entirely ephemeral.  
The Supreme Court of 1973, which decided Keith, however, 
would not have allowed this to occur.  Perhaps someday, 
especially if the present Supreme Court stays out of this 
controversy and issues no binding precedents, future judges 
will recognize that the central meaning of the Special Needs 
Doctrine, along with statutory requirements such as 
minimization rules, provide an authoritative path to 
maintaining as much separation between foreign intelligence 
and criminal investigations as is feasible. 
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